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CHANGE DETECTION OF EMOTIONAL INFORMATION ACROSS THE ADULT 
LIFESPAN 
MARIA J. DONALDSON-MISENER 
ABSTRACT 
Visual change detection ability is necessary for successful interaction with the 
environment, yet few studies have been conducted on change detection with older adults, 
and whether their use of top-down and bottom-up processing differs from younger adults, 
especially with emotional processing. Emotions can be motivating and guide the scope of 
attention using top-down processing and can capture attention in an automatic, bottom-up 
fashion. Theories of socioemotional aging suggest that younger and older adults may be 
differentially motivated to process positive and/or negative aspects of the environment, 
and these tendencies may have implications for age-related trajectories in well-being. 
Change detection efficacy in older adulthood may be influenced by whether individuals 
process salient and motivationally relevant emotional stimuli. To address the impact of 
age and emotional information processing on change detection performance, two 
experiments were conducted.  Experiment 1 addressed whether individuals differ in their 
detection of neutral and emotional object changes and whether such differences are 
influenced by age. Participants were instructed to detect the appearance or disappearance 
of positive, negative, and neutral objects to understand how these factors impact change 
detection ability. Positive preferences were noted for both age groups, with enhanced 
processing for positive onsets and negative offsets. The focus of Experiment 2 was to 
investigate the influence of four top-down motivations, prioritizing each visual change 
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and valence on change detection by creating contexts in which the target may be initially 
non-emotional, but the target acquires emotional meaning based on the situation. The 
strength of Experiment 2 was to assess the role of explicit top-down motivations on how 
emotional goals and contextual features may impact change detection for younger and 
older adults, which could not be assessed in Experiment 1. Overall, negativity effects 
emerged in Experiment 2, wherein both younger and older adults prioritized processing 
of negative onsets in the threat condition, contrary to Experiment 1. The present research 
revealed many age similarities in change detection ability. Participants’ attention was 
commanded more heavily toward positive targets in the absence of a specific motivation, 
but when provided with explicit top-down motivation, participants’ attention was most 
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The human attentional system constantly processes a remarkable amount of 
information. We live in a dynamic world, and there are multiple demands on our attention 
at any given time (Malcolm & Shomstein, 2015). Attentional capacity is finite. We 
simply cannot constantly attend to every aspect of our visual field, and any attempts to do 
so would be overwhelming. Thus, human cognition is adept at prioritizing salient visual 
events. Maintenance of attentional prioritization and related abilities are critical across 
the lifespan, and there is active debate surrounding preservation of attentional faculties 
across adulthood and old age (Costello, Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010; 
Knight, Seymour, Gaunt, Baker, Nesmith, & Mather, 2007). Attention is a multi-faceted 
process; some facets of which tend to decline as we age and others that remain intact 
across older adulthood. Specifically, Costello and colleagues (2010) maintain that there is 
evidence of top-down attentional control being preserved across the adult lifespan. In this 
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regard, when an older adult has a particular goal in mind, he or she is able to accomplish 
this goal by maintaining attentional focus on facets of the environment congruent with his 
or her intentions. Conversely, older adults may have difficulty inhibiting distraction, so 
even if their top-down attentional resources are actively seeking out goal-relevant 
information in the environment, they may have difficulty tuning out extraneous visual 
information (Rodrigues & Pandeirada, 2015).  
Intact attentional abilities are critical to many facets of life, including driving, 
independent living, and detection of threat and danger. Findings from studies assessing a 
variety of attentional domains indicate age-related declines in processing speed 
(Salthouse, 1996), reduced useful field of view (UFOV; Wood & Owsley, 2014), and 
decreased spatial location ability (Scialfa & Kline, 1988). Because all of these processes 
affect attentional faculties, which enable us to successfully navigate our environments 
and make sense of the world, it is logical to examine how these processes interact as we 
age.  
Mechanisms Underlying Attention 
Individuals use both top-down and bottom-up processing resources to 
successfully engage with the environment on a daily basis. When top-down processing is 
used, prior knowledge, experience, and motivations guide our perceptions, in a 
potentially goal-oriented manner. Bottom-up processing is data-driven and occurs when a 
stimulus, or features of a stimulus, in the environment command attention, often very 
quickly (Nothdurft, 2000). According to Nothdurft, attentional capture via bottom-up or 
exogenous means generally occurs because the object or event ultimately commanding 
attention is distinct from the surrounding environment through size, color, luminance, or 
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other salient features. Top-down control enables people to overtly seek out particular 
information in the visual world, depending on observers’ behavioral goals and/or prior 
knowledge (Walther & Koch, 2007). For example, a building surveyor assessing a 
skyscraper on a busy street is able to attend only to the visual information that is 
necessary to complete his or her job (i.e., appearance of windows, the foundation, and 
upper levels). S/he can successfully inhibit the noise of street traffic, vendors, or birds 
flying. Exogenous and endogenous attentional systems function in concert with one 
another. That is, if someone shouted for help, or a bus were driving toward him/her, 
bottom-up processing resources would likely be activated. When bottom-up driven 
attentional activation occurs, s/he has effectively “paused” his/her survey, and s/he can 
quickly react to a call for help or avoid the bus. In this sense, when we use top-down 
processing resources, we can volitionally interact with aspects of the environment that fit 
with our current behavioral goals and deprioritize other aspects that are not goal-relevant. 
However, since bottom-up processing often operates in the background, we can rapidly 
use these resources to react to events in need of our immediate attention.   
From an evolutionary point of view, the interplay between top-down control and 
bottom-up informational processing is advantageous. Both top-down and bottom-up 
processing resources are used in typical attentional processing tasks, such as a visual 
search task. Although bottom-up processing mechanisms are particularly useful when 
targets are distinct from background noise and distractors, or when targets represent a 
distinct visual event (i.e., onset of a new object), these types of situations rarely occur in 
natural environments. Moreover, most natural environments are imbued with emotional 
content. Much prior work assessing the role of exogenous and endogenous attentional 
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control has been conducted using neutral stimuli, with less of a focus on emotionally 
evocative information. 
 Typically, visual search and attentional tasks involve attentional capture via the 
“pop out” or onset of an object through exogenous or bottom-up processing means. 
Attentional capture by other types of visual events, such as offsets, or the disappearance 
of previously viewed stimuli, likely occur through endogenous or top-down processing 
means, as this form of capture is typically construed as being more dependent on prior 
knowledge and goal-relevant motives (Walther & Koch, 2007). However, when 
emotional information is introduced, as in the present experiments, valence affects both 
endogenous and exogenous attentional streams. Negative, and especially threatening, 
events that appear in a visual array are likely to be efficiently and prioritized due to 
bottom-up/exogenous salience (Mather & Sutherland, 2011). Attentional capture by 
negative or threatening stimuli is detected in early visual areas (Theeuwes, 2004), and is 
processed quickly through the ventral component of the frontoparietal network, in a 
stimulus-driven, or exogenous, manner. This form of attentional capture temporarily 
dampens attention guided by behavioral goals and motivations so that we can efficiently 
process and react to negative and salient events for survival. Furthermore, attentional 
guidance toward positive events can be motivated by top-down or endogenous means, 
especially when these are relevant to observers’ behavioral goals (Mather & Sutherland). 
Attentional guidance toward positive events is especially relevant for older adults who 
have a more limited future time perspective, and so are cognitively motivated to seek out 
positive information (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Because positively 
valenced stimuli typically does not entail a threat component, it is processed in the dorsal 
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component of the frontoparietal network (Cabeza, 2002) and other higher order cortical 
areas later in the processing stream (Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004) because guiding 
attention toward self-relevant goals may be an ongoing process, not one that must occur 
instantaneously. Thus, in order to fully appreciate the role of emotion on attentional 
capture, emotion must be examined within an interplay of endogenous and exogenous 
processing streams, as both forms of attentional processing of emotional information are 
likely to be encountered regularly in naturalistic settings within our environment.  
Some evidence suggests that bottom-up processing may be impaired in older 
adulthood, and perceptual changes may be more difficult to detect in a bottom-up 
manner, especially if visual changes are neutral or irrelevant to one’s behavioral goals 
(Porter, Wright, Tales, & Gilchrist, 2012). However, considerable evidence supports the 
preservation of top-down processing abilities as we age (Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, & 
Bucur, 2005), such that older adults are capable of volitionally engaging with certain 
aspects of the environment. This ability promotes inhibition of distracting and irrelevant 
stimuli, which contributes to more efficient search strategies and attentional control 
(Peterson & Kramer, 2001). In addition, more recent evidence suggests that older adults 
are as capable as younger adults at inhibiting distracting stimuli when informative cues 
are present; however, attentional capture of irrelevant information is more likely for older 
adults compared to younger adults when informative cues are unavailable (Whiting, 
Madden, & Babcock, 2007). Although top-down attentional control is largely preserved, 
there are some age-related declines in maintenance of attentional guidance that can affect 
the efficiency and success of visual search (e.g., Colcombe et al., 2003). Notably, age-
related reductions in working memory capacity may contribute to difficulties with 
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cognitive control during visual search tasks (Redick & Engle, 2011), and older adults 
may experience particular difficulty with inhibiting distracting information (Hsieh, Wu, 
& Tang, 2016), which may prolong the time it takes to detect targets during a visual 
search.  
Through the interaction of both forms of processing, individuals are able to 
volitionally interact with the environment because bottom-up processing resources, which 
often run in the background, can override top-down processing control if stimuli that are 
in need of immediate attention (i.e., something threatening) emerge (Yantis, 2005). A 
frontoparietal network is implicated during visual search and other attentional tasks 
(Kastner, 2004). The dorsal component of this network promotes attentional guidance via 
top-down processing (Cabeza, 2002). Because of age-related increases in frontal lobe 
activity during cognitive processing, older adults may rely more heavily on top-down 
processing resources compared to younger adults (Cabeza, 2002). Conversely, 
information that could signal threat and danger rapidly attracts attention and is guided by 
bottom-up processing faculties through the ventral component of the frontoparietal 
network (Madden, 2007). Here, attentional resources are quickly deployed away from 
one’s behavioral goals and toward these salient events when informed by stimulus-driven 
processes in our perceptual systems (Theeuwes, 2004). Thus, it is logical that attentional 
capture through stimulus-driven means occurs rapidly, as early visual areas process this 
information (Theeuwes, 2004). Conversely, top-down attentional control requires the 
activation of higher order cortical processing and occurs later in the processing stream 
(Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004). Theeuwes (2004) maintains that top-down attentional 
control will always be overridden by bottom-up processing if a threat arises, or some 
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other visual event in the environment requires immediate attention. Additionally, top-
down attentional control is likely to dominate when demands for bottom-up processing 
are low (Rolls, 2008). Thus, when observers do not need to be vigilant to potential 
threats, attention is more likely to be guided by top-down motivational cues. However, 
once the situation changes such that vigilance and quick responses to visual events are 
again relevant, the attentional system can minimize the top-down system and prioritize 
attentional capture through bottom-up processing means. Current research supports an 
ongoing interplay between top-down and bottom-up processing for both younger and 
older adults. This relationship can be modulated depending on the demands of the 
situation and the goals of the individual, so as to ensure successful interactions with the 
environment (Yantis, 2005).   
Attentional Prioritization 
Generally, the human attentional system is adept at directing attention to further 
process salient information within our environment. Given the complex nature of our 
visual environment, it is expected that not all visual events will be processed with 
equitable efficiency. The specific aspects of the visual world that command attention 
differ across environments and age groups, and even within individuals, as motivations 
and abilities vary. In this manner, we are remarkably capable of using attentional 
resources efficiently. However, sometimes, as will be covered thoroughly later, salient 
visual events fail to attract attention adaptively (Simons & Rensink, 2005). Because of 
these occurrences, it is necessary to better understand the circumstances surrounding 
instances when our attentional systems fail to prioritize important visual events and how 
to minimize the frequency of these instances (Malcolm & Shomstein, 2015). 
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Scene processing. Considerations of how organisms visually process a scene or 
environment reveal that not all features receive equal attention. For instance, when an 
observer initially approaches a room, if each table or floor tile received as much 
consideration as more relevant and informative stimuli (e.g., peoples’ faces, a dangerous 
object/weapon), scene processing would be highly inefficient, navigation within this 
environment would be impaired, and our survival could be compromised. By efficiently 
prioritizing visual events in the environment, humans (and several non-human species) 
automatically allocate attentional resources toward other individuals, and potential threats 
are attended to prior to engaging with more mundane visual features (e.g., Parasuraman 
& Galster, 2013).  
Visual search. As mentioned earlier, an area of visual attentional research 
relevant to a discussion of attentional prioritization is visual search. Visual search 
paradigms that focus on attentional capture are helpful in order to evaluate how the 
prioritization of visual events unfolds. In a typical visual search study, participants are 
instructed to look for a pre-specified target stimulus among other distractor symbols, 
shapes, or letters within a visual array. Generally, the array is continuously presented 
until the target is located; thus, this task assesses attentional functioning without strong 
demands on memory ability (Yantis & Jonides, 1984). Here, the type of target stimulus 
and distractors are task-dependent, but target characteristics can also influence how 
effectively the target is located.  
As we age, declines in sensory abilities, executive function, and selective 
attention can impact visual search ability, particularly for more challenging visual 
searches (i.e., larger search arrays, less distinction between targets and distractors), which 
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can result from age-related reductions in brain volume in dorsal frontoparietal regions 
(Müller-Oehring, Schulte, Rohlfing, Pfefferbaum, & Sullivan, 2013). However, there is 
evidence for maintained selective attention ability in cases of top-down control (Costello, 
Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010). In other words, older adults can maintain 
attention or direct attention toward visual events, consistent with their behavioral goals, 
and away from distractors using top-down processing mechanisms. To illustrate, if an 
older individual is watching a movie with some sad elements, but their behavioral goal is 
to maintain a positive mood, he or she may selectively attend to the non-negative aspects 
of the movie and ignore scenes or elements that are sad and thereby undermine the 
experience of any pleasant feelings. Relatedly, there is research suggesting that within 
certain memory and attention tasks, presenting information that is either in line with older 
adults’ motivational goals or is imbued with personal relevance (e.g., themes such as 
grandparenthood and retirement), performance is more successful (Mather & Carstensen, 
2005). Thus, perhaps observations of age-related deficits in visual search could at least be 
partially mitigated by providing older adults with motivationally-relevant stimuli.  
Change detection and blindness. Change detection is another domain of 
attention wherein prioritization of changing visual events over static ones becomes 
critical. Next time a basketball game is on, watch how often the players move up and 
down the court, change orientations, and adjust the movements and positions of their 
bodies. In most complex environments, many items will change moment to moment: cars 
will travel along a road, traffic signals change, animals move about. Other objects, such 
as sidewalks and buildings, remain static. However, with limited attentional resources 
available, people typically do not focus on unchanging features of the environment. 
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Rather, it is important to dedicate attentional resources to the objects that change, as these 
objects may be very informative and may necessitate an adaptive response (i.e., for 
personal safety/survival).  
In some cases, despite attempting to maintain vigilance to our surroundings, 
people fail to notice large visual changes in their environment, a phenomenon referred to 
as change blindness (Simons & Rensink, 2005). Although it is ideal to respond to visual 
changes as quickly as possible, particularly if such changes represent a potential threat, in 
some cases, the visual event goes unnoticed. Change blindness may occur more 
frequently if the environment is particularly complex, there are too many facets of the 
environment to attend to adequately, or if people are experiencing stress or trying to 
manage too many internal tasks (Simons & Rensink, 2005).   
Change blindness was first demonstrated in the laboratory by using an 
experimental technique known as the flicker paradigm, which is intended to simulate 
what happens during an eye movement (i.e., saccade; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997). 
In this paradigm, two images that are identical to one another, except that one of the 
objects in the image changes to another object (e.g., a stapler in one image is replaced by 
a ruler in the other image), “flicker” over one another in an alternating pattern until the 
change is located. Rensink et al. observed that an unexpectedly long duration (5 seconds 
on average if the change is in a central interest location, and 10 seconds on average if the 
change is in a marginal interest location) was required for successful detection of the 
difference between the images. In other words, basic change detection may not be 
particularly efficient. This occurrence has been demonstrated both within (Bubic, 2008) 
and outside a laboratory environment (Simons & Levin, 2004). 
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Simons and Rensink (2005) posit that although change blindness is a common 
occurrence, it does not happen randomly. Susceptibility to change blindness may differ 
for different kinds of visual events, for people of different ages, and for different qualities 
of a visual scene (e.g., perceptual salience and/or motivational importance). Change 
blindness can occur in normal everyday situations. For example, movie viewers may miss 
the presence of bloopers and other mistakes editors may have overlooked. Additionally, a 
distracted driver may fail to notice another vehicle on a road. As illustrated by these 
examples, although it may appear that we are vigilant to our surroundings, attend to 
details in the environment, and notice the people around us, attention is not an unlimited 
resource (Simons & Rensink, 2005). Aspects of typical activities in our daily lives may 
not capture attention, but more critically, people fail to notice visual changes in complex 
high-risk environments (Levin & Varakin, 2004). Failure to notice such visual changes 
can lead to grave consequences. 
Noticing when changes occur in the environment can be challenging and taxing. 
In our daily lives, we encounter situations where it is necessary to recognize the 
replacement of objects (e.g., one customer from another at a food service counter), object 
onsets (e.g., another vehicle merging ahead on a highway), and object offsets (e.g., 
missing merchandise in a retail store). The priority given to each of these visual events is 
largely a product of the salience and urgency that the events represent, as well as the 
context in which they are situated (e.g., missing child versus missing merchandise). 
Maintaining successful change detection ability is advantageous in all domains, but since 
attention is a finite resource, attending to everything in the environment is overwhelming 
and untenable.   
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The particular psychological mechanisms influencing whether or not visual 
changes are successfully detected have been the subject of active debate in the selective 
attention literature; researchers generally agree that change blindness occurs in 
conjunction with the deployment of observers’ attention (Bubic, 2008). Overall, the 
human attentional system is able to detect and react to salient stimuli with remarkable 
speed and efficiency. As mentioned earlier, since attentional capacity is finite, it is 
maladaptive to allocate limited resources to objects or features that are stable and 
unchanging. Instead, even when focusing or attending to something in the environment, 
people allocate more attentional resources to novel or distinct components (Yantis, 2005). 
This form of attentional deployment transpires regardless of observers’ goals, indicating 
this process occurs as an extension of bottom-up processing (Beck & Kastner, 2005). 
However, salient stimuli can also contain motivational value (e.g., emotional stimuli that 
signal the presence of a threat or danger that should be avoided), or a sudden onset, 
offset, or change in a stimulus may be informative to the viewer because he or she may 
have to respond to the stimulus in some way (e.g., move lanes to avoid a merging 
vehicle). As such, change detection of salient stimuli can occur without voluntary intent, 
so attentional deployment can be beneficial to our survival (Rauschenberger, 2003).  
Change detection and aging. Early work on change detection ability in older 
adults has not yet fully explained how mechanisms underlying attentional processing 
operate later in life. Preliminary evidence supports the preservation of some bottom-up 
and top-down processing resources (Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, & Bucur, 2005; Costello, 
Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010), but whether and how these mechanisms alter 
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change detection ability as people age is not fully understood, given that change detection 
relies on a successful interaction of bottom-up and top-down components. 
Within a standard change detection paradigm, both bottom-up and top-down 
processing resources can be utilized depending on the nature of the change. As outlined 
in more detail below, the detection of a new object entering one’s field of view is 
assumed to engage bottom-up processing resources (i.e., due to the novelty and 
perceptual salience of an object onset). Conversely, the detection of objects being 
removed from a scene may rely more heavily on top-down processing resources since the 
observer must use their memory of the preceding scene/environment to accurately detect 
the change. Research on change detection from a developmental framework is crucial to 
informing the debate about attentional preservation across the lifespan, particularly 
because intact visual change detection abilities promote successful interaction with our 
environment. In general, little is known regarding particular changes (declines, 
improvement, maintenance) in change detection ability across the adult lifespan. Previous 
work on change detection ability in older adults has yielded somewhat mixed findings, 
further complicated by the use of different types of tasks, stimuli, and conceptualizations 
of change paradigms.  
In one previous study, Costello and colleagues (2010) found that older adults 
were less efficient at change detection and, thus, were more susceptible to change 
blindness because older adults exhibited lower accuracy and required more cycles within 
a flicker paradigm to locate a change. Declines in processing speed may have 
compounded these deficits in visual attention, especially when the target is unknown 
and/or a computer-generated abstract symbol, as is the case with standard change 
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detection tasks (Costello, Madden, Mitroff, & Whiting, 2010). In another study, older 
adults took more time to detect changes in driving-related photographs (Pringle, Irwin, 
Kramer, & Atchley, 2001). Pringle et al. posited that an additional time consideration 
(i.e., speed of search) for the specified target or change might compound the amount of 
time older adults needed to locate the change (Humphrey & Kramer, 1977). However, 
Veiel, Storandt, and Abrams (2006) pointed out that Pringle and colleagues failed to 
control for known age-related declines in processing speed ability when using an older 
adult sample.  
Veiel, Storandt, and Abrams (2006) further addressed age-related differences in 
change detection performance using eye-tracking to demonstrate predictive relationships 
between near-real time visual attention metrics and change detection ability. Veiel and 
colleagues observed that age differences in change detection ability could be explained 
by age-related reductions in processing speed and a reduced useful field of view (UFOV). 
Additionally, their data also indicated that older adults rechecked the location of the 
change, perhaps due to stricter criteria for making detection decisions. For example, an 
older individual may only indicate that he or she has found the change by returning to the 
correct location to confirm the detection. A younger adult may be more comfortable with 
some degree of uncertainty. Thus, older adults may exhibit slower reaction times than 
younger adults because older adults report the change when they are sure, rather than 
when they first detect it.  
To fully appreciate age-related differences and context-dependent declines in 
change detection ability, researchers must also consider related faculties known to 
diminish with age. For example, spatial localization ability is known to decrease with 
15 
 
age, a resource used in scene processing; thus, this perceptual component may also hinder 
older adults’ change detection ability (Scialfa & Kline, 1988). Furthermore, Veiel and 
colleagues (2006) found that older adults’ change detection ability, compared to younger 
adults, was compromised above and beyond what would be predicted by processing 
speed theories alone. Current findings in the literature point to greater change blindness 
for older adults compared to younger adults (Costello, Madden, Mitroff, & Whiting, 
2010; Veiel, Storandt, & Abrams, 2006), although this shift may represent a multifaceted 
process attributable to difficulty with inhibition and general age-related declines in 
attention. 
Mechanisms underlying change detection performance: onset primacy. 
Attentional mechanisms underlying age differences in change detection can differ as a 
function of experience, motivation, behavioral goals, and the type of visual change that 
occurs. Early studies on change detection and change blindness included instances of 
unexpected object replacement, both in the laboratory (e.g., office supplies changing to 
other office supplies; Levin & Varakin, 2004) and in more natural settings outside the lab 
(e.g., the exchange of one conversation partner by another; Simons & Levin, 2004). 
Change blindness research has more recently focused on other types of visual changes to 
further understand the circumstances under which awareness is hampered. In one type of 
task, participants are required to identify an abrupt change in the search display, wherein 
the target stimulus is either the appearance of a new object (object onset) or the 
disappearance of a previously viewed object (object offset). Results from studies using 
these types of tasks have consistently revealed that onsets are detected with greater speed 
and accuracy than object offsets (Yantis & Jonides, 1984). Yantis and Jonides described 
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this phenomenon as onset primacy. Brockmole and Henderson (2005) used eye-tracking 
to investigate the role of transients, which are changes in visual properties that co-occur 
with object onsets. These researchers found that participants could attend to a non-
transient onset if the participants had an opportunity to develop some memory for a visual 
scene prior to the onset. However, attentional capture in this manner is driven by top-
down means, rather than attentional capture by onsets accompanied by visual transients, 
which occur in a bottom-up fashion. In this sense, attentional mechanisms can adapt to 
various types of onsets, but this form of attentional capture has a strong memorial 
component (Brockmole & Henderson, 2005). In addition to transients, other changes in 
visual properties, such as luminance, quantity, and color, are also produced during the 
onset of a new object; however, evidence from the visual search literature indicates that 
the object onset itself, rather than other concomitant visual changes, ultimately captures 
an observer’s attention (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; but see also Hollingworth, Simons, & 
Franconeri, 2010).  
Because there are instances where we must identify missing objects or recognize 
that something has been added to our field of view, more research has been dedicated to 
onsets and offsets compared to other types of visual change events (e.g., Cole, 
Liversedge, & Simon, 2006; Cole, Kentridge, & Heywood, 2004). Thus, support for 
onset primacy has also been noted in change blindness paradigms. Cole et al. (2003) used 
a one-shot flicker paradigm, in which two images are presented in succession, separated 
by a gray screen, for only one cycle. Cole and colleagues found that observers were more 
resistant to change blindness when experiencing object onsets than offsets, presumably 
due to onset primacy. Using three-dimensional scenes with naturally occurring visual 
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cues in a one-shot flicker paradigm, Donaldson and Yamamoto (2012) replicated Cole et 
al.’s (2003) findings, providing further evidence that onset primacy exists in a change 
blindness context. In sum, research indicates that the prioritization of relevant visual 
events, and specifically onset primacy, is a robust occurrence applicable to many domains 
of visual attention.  
Change detection and attentional flexibility. It is likely that onset primacy 
occurs for its evolutionary value. By attending to - and evaluating - the importance of 
new objects entering into one’s environment, observer’s increase the likelihood of 
reacting appropriately, which thereby promotes survival (Cole et al., 2003). Until an 
onset succeeds in capturing attention, it is unknown to the observer if it is necessary to 
react in a particular way. Thus, new objects are generally processed rapidly to optimize 
survival. Yet, as Cole et al. and Donaldson and Yamamoto (2012) have demonstrated, it 
is not the case that offsets are missed entirely. Successful detection of all types of visual 
changes probably has some survival utility (Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2016); thus, 
change detection ability should extend beyond the scope of onset primacy. Take 
lifeguarding for example. Here, the processing advantage likely shifts from onset 
detection to offset detection for purposes of loss prevention. For instance, a lifeguard 
must be able to recognize when a swimmer has disappeared from view (i.e., has gone 
underwater) and take appropriate action in that scenario. Thus, detection of offset events 
is just as important (if not more so) as onset primacy in that context. Relatedly, 
Donaldson and Yamamoto (2016) pitted two hypotheses, the default mode hypothesis 
(i.e., bias for detecting onsets both more rapidly and more accurately) and the attention 
modulation hypothesis (i.e., flexibility with detecting offsets more efficiently under 
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situations where this is favorable), against one another to determine if onset primacy 
persists in environments prioritizing offset detection. In other words, the default mode 
refers to the tendency to be more vigilant to onset detection using bottom-up processing 
resources, whereas attentional modulation allows for flexible detection of offsets when 
task and motivational manipulations are provided that promote offset prioritization using 
top-down processing resources. If support were found for the default mode hypothesis, 
then onset primacy would still be observed in experimental conditions favoring offset 
advantage. However, under the attention modulation hypothesis, although it may be the 
case that the human attentional system is programmed toward onset primacy, as it may 
indeed be advantageous in most situations, if a scenario arose favoring an offset 
advantage, we should be able to flexibly adapt to offsets. Thus, we sought to answer 
whether onset primacy is a hard and fast rule or whether it could be overridden if the 
environment, and behavioral goals of the observer are congruent with an offset 
advantage.  
 In this study, participants were randomly divided into one of four conditions. All 
participants viewed a training block and a testing block. The testing block contained 
equal amounts of onset and offset trials and was identical for all participants. The 
difference between conditions was the structure of the training trials. One condition 
provided no specific instruction for favoring onsets or offsets, and an equal number of 
onset and offset trials were presented; another condition induced offset bias by having 
participants receive a disproportionate percentage of offset relative to onset trials during 
the training block (80% vs. 20%); another condition gave participants explicit 
instructions to focus on offset trials, but there were an equal proportion of onset and 
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offset trials; and finally, a condition had participants explicitly focus on offset trials and 
provided a disproportionate number of offset to onset trials (80% to 20%). Participants 
viewed image pairs that represented either an onset or an offset. Images were presented 
using a one-shot flicker paradigm. Participants completed a left-right judgment task to 
indicate the side of the screen on which the change occurred. Participants were able to 
respond following the appearance of the second image, at which point, participants had 
viewed both photographs and could judge which object had been removed or added. 
Reaction time and accuracy were recorded when a button press occurred. 
 Results based on the training block data for younger adults revealed significantly 
shorter reaction times to onset trials compared to offset trials when no offset instructions 
were presented and there were an equal number of onset and offset trials. However, 
significantly shorter reaction times were observed for offset trials compared to onset trials 
in the condition where offset instructions were given and the trial where the majority of 
trials were offsets. These results suggest that implicitly exposing participants to 
additional offset trials without an instruction, or giving them equal amounts of onsets and 
offset trials with an instruction to attend with greater priority to offsets, was sufficient for 
reducing onset primacy. However, when these two manipulations were combined, offset 
bias was actually promoted. These results carried over successfully into a testing block 
but only when the number of training trials was doubled. Results from this study indicate 
that attentional modulation to promote detection of offsets can occur when individuals are 
provided sufficient motivation, but the strongest effect emerges when both bottom-up 




Attentional flexibility in aging. Age differences in the speed of change detection 
may be expected when investigating attention across the adult life span; however, 
reductions in the speed of detection are less interesting than understanding how the 
mechanisms guiding change detection may unfold as we age. When the Donaldson and 
Yamamoto (2016) attentional flexibility paradigm was applied to an older adult sample, 
results revealed a significant interaction between trial type and condition on reaction 
time, such that onset primacy was eliminated for participants who received both the 
additional offset trials during a first block and an instruction to attend more during offset 
trials. Additionally, a marginally significant interaction between trial type and condition 
indicated higher accuracy on offset trials for participants provided with both 
manipulations. These results offer additional evidence for attentional flexibility whereby 
offset biases successfully emerge through the dynamic interplay of both bottom-up and 
top-down processing mechanisms, suggesting that both components may be integral to 
supporting older adults’ successful change detection performance.  
 There is additional evidence that both bottom-up and top-down manipulations 
impact older adults’ performance on attentional tasks, which is beneficial for older adults 
so that they can engage volitionally with a scene while remaining vigilant to salient 
events (Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004). Results from the younger adult sample in 
Donaldson and Yamamoto (2016) suggest that the human visual system is particularly 
tuned to the detection of object onsets; however, data from the older adult sample 
provides evidence that the human attentional system can adaptively and flexibly adjust to 
detect non-onset events. Since older adults likely have a longer history of exposure to 
many different types of visual experiences, they may be more in tune with detection of 
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non-onset events than younger adults. Alternatively, onsets and offsets may represent two 
fundamentally distinct forms of visual events. Without attending to an onset, it is 
unknown whether it is benign or may pose a threat; since offsets are deletions of 
previously viewed aspects of the environment, their occurrence may not command 
attention with such immediacy as onsets. However, it is unclear if this discrepancy 
between the noticeability of onsets and offsets will hold for all types of stimuli or objects. 
Previous change detection paradigms have relied on basic objects, which are neutral in 
nature, presented within situations where participants may not be overly motivated to 
attend to these visual stimuli in a particular way. However, most scenarios that 
necessitate adaptive change detection in our day-to-day lives likely have an emotional 
quality, providing interesting test cases for age-related trajectories in change detection 
abilities in more realistic contexts. Emotional information can be highly salient and 
processed with high priority for individuals of all ages (Carstensen & Turk-Charles, 
1994). Furthermore, many natural examples of onset (avoiding colliding with a merging 
vehicle) and offset (a lifeguard needing to notice swimmers that go underwater) detection 
represent situations that are imbued with emotional value.  
Aging and Emotional Attention 
 In our daily lives, people encounter both positive and negative information, in 
personal experiences of affect, as well as in facial expressions and images. Emotional 
information can help guide our cognition and behavior in a variety of situations. 
Emotionally valenced stimuli are often very noticeable, and humans have a natural 
tendency to deploy attentional resources toward the processing of emotional information 
in the environment (Carretié, 2014).  Diverse emotionality is central to the human 
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experience, and recognition of emotional valence informs how people should respond to 
their environment and help shape current and future behavior. 
The way in which people attend to - and process - emotional information may 
change as a function of age. Sociemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen, Isaacaowitz, 
& Charles, 1999) provides a motivational account, based on an individual’s future time 
perspective, for how younger and older adults may differentially process emotional 
information. For instance, with advancing age, older adults may become acutely aware of 
limits to future time left in life. This awareness may cause a shift in motivational focus 
toward goals that would be beneficial in the here-in-now, such as feeling good and being 
happy. Conversely, younger adults likely have a more expansive time perspective, 
facilitating a focus on information gathering goals that can be applied in the future. These 
shifts in goal prioritization may be reflected in how individuals preferentially process 
emotional information in their environment. For instance, older adults’ motivation toward 
present-oriented well-being goals may lead to preferential engagement toward positive, 
and/or the avoidance of negative, information (in comparison to younger adults) in the 
environment. This preferential positive focus in emotional information processing has 
been termed a positivity effect (Carstensen, Mathers, & Mikels, 2006; Reed & Carstensen, 
2012).  
Evidence for the positivity effect has been observed across several studies and 
research paradigms, including assessments of visual attention. Specifically, previous 
studies have revealed older adults’ preferential attention toward positive and/or away 
from negative stimuli (i.e., facial expressions, images, and words) using a variety of 
attentional measures, including dot probe (Mather & Carstensen, 2003) and eye-tracking 
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tasks (Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008; Isaacowitz Wadlinger, Goren, & 
Wilson, 2006; Knight, Seymour, Gaunt, Baker, Nesmith, & Mather, 2007). In a recent 
meta-analysis, Reed, Chan, and Mikels (2014) observed that positivity effects in visual 
attention are more likely to emerge under consciously controlled processing conditions 
and when attentional resources are least restricted. Thus, older adults’ positive emotional 
preferences likely necessitate top-down processing networks that actively seek out 
information that facilitates positive affective goals in the moment.  
While supported by a substantial literature, age-related positivity effects are not 
ubiquitous across studies; hence, there are likely boundary conditions as to when 
positivity effects do and do not emerge. For example, when given sufficient explicit 
motivation (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2009) or instructions to attend to specific or non-
emotional aspects of a stimulus, positivity effects can be overridden (Reed & Carstensen, 
2012). Additionally, Noh and Isaacowitz (2015) found that when distractors impede 
control of visual attention, positivity effects are not observed. Finally, another study 
assessed older and younger adults’ attention toward both negative and positive targets in 
the presence of distractors that were neutral or of the opposite valence of the target (Ziaei, 
von Hippel, Henry, & Becker, 2015). Older adult participants were just as capable as 
younger adults at resisting attentional capture from positively valenced distractors when 
encoding negatively valenced targets. Thus, positivity effects may not be observed in 
scenarios where bottom-up assessments of visual attention are examined, or at least 
within a time course that commands attention via bottom-up mechanisms. This later point 
is evidenced by a previous study that had participants view a series of positive-neutral 
and negative-neutral face pairs. Age-related positivity effects did not emerge until 500 ms 
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post-stimulus onset and were strongest after 2,000-3,000 ms (Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, 
& Schlangel, 2009). Knight and colleagues (2007) also observed a lack of valence 
preferences in older adults’ visual attention within early fixation measures (i.e., first 
fixation deployment) when employing an eye-tracking divided attention paradigm. Thus, 
perhaps both positive and negative visual events confer bottom-up salience above and 
beyond top-down motivational importance within assessments of early attention.  
While substantial research documents advantages with having an age-related 
positivity bias, failure to attend to negative information can have undesirable, 
maladaptive consequences. However, it may be more appropriate to conceptualize this 
trend as a default attentional strategy intended to bolster positive affect. In visual search 
tasks, older adults engage with negative information just as efficiently as younger adults 
when instructed to do so (Lundqvist, Svärd, & Fischer, 2013). Hence, even if positivity 
effects indicate a preference or a default strategy, such preferences do not necessarily 
reflect older adults’ inability to attend effectively to negative information.  
Threatening visual events represent a special class of negative stimuli due to their 
highly arousing nature and need for more immediate attention, and older adults are able 
to adequately deploy attention toward arousing negative stimuli (Hahn, Carlson, 
Gronlund, & Singer, 2005). Additionally, older adults respond to high arousing images 
just as quickly as younger adults (Leclerc & Kensinger, 2008). Thus, along with a 
potential top-down, goal driven default preference for the positive, older adults can 
rapidly deploy attention toward salient negative inputs (Mather & Carstensen, 2005; 
Mather & Knight, 2006, Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009; Hahn et al., 
2006). For instance, Mather and Knight (2006) observed that older adults were able to 
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rapidly identify angry faces relative to joyful faces, suggesting maintenance of negative 
salience in old age. Ruffman, Ng, and Jenkin (2009) also found that while older adults 
may be less adept at providing labels for particular emotional facial expressions (i.e., 
anger), older adults are able to attend and respond quickly to these stimuli. Thus, 
although positivity effects represent a motivational shift, when such a preference would 
be less pressing or maladaptive, older adults are able to deploy resources toward the 
negative.  
Change Detection of Emotional Information 
Typical change detection paradigms tend to employ non-emotional stimuli/images 
within visual arrays; however, the ability to detect changes to emotional objects/scenes 
may be more important for determining an individual’s true change detection efficacy 
(Michael & Gálvez-García, 2011). Neutral or mundane objects may be less informative, 
less motivationally relevant, and require less immediacy in comparison to emotional 
stimuli/objects. Michael and Gálvez-García suggest that one strategy individuals use in 
visual search tasks is to move from the most to the least salient object when finding a 
target. In this manner, observers may naturally gravitate to the most arousing or salient 
aspects of a scene before surveying aspects of the array that are least arousing or salient. 
Only a few studies have addressed how change detection ability may operate as a 
function of emotionality, and these studies have yielded mixed findings. For instance, 
Liang and Yu (2012) found that positive stimuli facilitated, and negative stimuli reduced, 
change detection performance; however, the facilitation effect for positive stimuli only 
occurred during cognitively demanding tasks. Thus, when task difficulty is high, 
controlled cognitive resources may be necessary to process positive events (Liang & Yu, 
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2012). Typically, attention to salient or arousing visual events occurs automatically 
without conscious intent. It seems unusual that change detection would be impaired when 
viewing negative stimuli in Liang and Yu’s study because previous literature on threat 
detection and bottom-up processing would predict that negative visual events should 
attract attention in a stimulus-driven fashion (LoBue, Matthews, Harvey, & Stark, 2014). 
It seems this finding could be partially reconciled by the possibility that the negative 
images used in Liang and Yu’s experiment did not elicit sufficient arousal to be perceived 
as threatening. Additionally, Loranel (2008) indicated that differences in change 
detection occur as a function of different emotions, but their results did not form a clear 
interpretable pattern.  
More work is needed to uncover patterns in how emotion affects change detection 
ability for informing current theories. Work on change detection for emotional stimuli is 
still quite new, and much research is needed in this area. However, as work on change 
detection and emotional processing continues to develop, it is likely that less change 
blindness will occur when the change carries emotional weight, compared to changes that 
are neutral. One explanation for this prediction is that it is advantageous to notice an 
emotional change because such events may require a particular reaction. Conversely, if a 
visual change is neutral, successful change detection may be less important. 
As exemplified by research on emotion and attentional processes, it would be 
incomplete to develop theories on aging and attention without investigating the role of 
emotion on various attentional processes, as emotion is relevant to understanding 
cognition in old age. Predictions from Socioemotional Selectivity Theory and the 
positivity effect would suggest that positive emotional stimuli are more likely to capture 
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older adults’ attention through top-down processing due to the importance of emotion 
regulation goal priorities in old age (Carstensen, Mikels, & Mather, 2006). Furthermore, 
negative stimuli may confer automatic saliency and be detected using bottom-up 
resources (Lundqvist, Svärd, & Fischer, 2013). Thus, it is probable that older adults’ 
change detection performance will be aided by exposure to emotional information, given 
that top-down and bottom-up processing could be adequately engaged when older adults 
are exposed to positive and negative stimuli.  
Older adults’ performance on change detection tasks within situations that are 
familiar, self-relevant, or in line with behavioral goals could be superior compared to 
performance on standard change detection tasks. Older adults’ processing of emotional 
information could be linked to motivational priority when stimuli are positive (top-down) 
or confer automatic salience when stimuli are negative (bottom-up). Thus, older adults’ 
change detection performance may be aided by scenarios that are emotional and/or self-
relevant. Objects that successfully capture attention differ between individuals and across 
age groups due to varied goals. Thus, it is likely that change detection ability is relevant 
to developmental trajectories of attentional processing.  
Some attention theorists posit that change blindness occurs because of our 
tendency to ignore the details of our visual field that are irrelevant to our goals, as well as 
the absence of active attention toward salient objects in the environment (Triesch, 
Ballard, Mayhoe, & Sullivan, 2003). Following Triesch and colleagues’ line of reasoning, 
older adults may be more susceptible to change blindness for neutral events because these 
details may not be inherently motivating (i.e., positive affective goals) or signal 
immediacy (i.e., threat detection). However, older adults may exhibit less change 
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blindness for emotional stimuli due to the more robust top-down and bottom-up salience 
of such information.  
In sum, older adults’ attentional foci are guided by motivationally relevant stimuli 
and environments, including finding positive aspects to maintain a positive mood 
(Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003) or adaptive reactivity when danger arises (Carretié, 
2014). Since many day-to-day scenarios that require rapid change detection consist of an 
emotional component, it is sensible to hypothesize that older adults’ change detection 
ability may be less encumbered when emotional images or scenarios are employed in 




























Results from current work on change detection, paired with theories of emotional 
processing in later life, indicate a need for research on how emotional processing operates 
within the realm of change detection scenarios. Change detection paradigms have 
bottom-up and top-down components, both of which guide emotional information 
processing. Few studies have assessed change detection with emotional information, and 
this is the first study to assess change detection of emotional information from an adult 
lifespan perspective. By adding an emotional component to a change detection task with 
a focus on aging, we can assess the following: 1.) whether top-down motivational 
relevance will facilitate change detection for positive stimuli for older adults (based on 
SST predictions) and/or 2.) whether bottom-up salience of negative emotional 
information is more influential in promoting change detection abilities in old age. In this 
manner, the inclusion of an emotional component could help us better understand age-
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related trajectories in change detection abilities, inform socioemotional theories on aging, 
and inform theories regarding detection as a function of change type (i.e., onset vs. 
offset). Thus, by assessing younger and older adults’ change detection performance in 
response to emotional and neutral onsets and offsets, we can independently and 
conjunctively test these effects.  
The aim of the present study is to uncover how younger and older adults may 
differentially attend to emotionally valenced visual events within a change detection 
paradigm. Given that adequate change detection abilities are essential for survival, and 
many instances in which change detection competency is needed in our daily lives 
involve emotional situations, it is possible that older adults’ change detection 
performance will be aided by an emotional component. Evidence for improved change 
detection ability within emotional scenarios could be broadly extended toward 
understanding age-related attentional functioning across other domains (i.e., in the 
context of driving efficacy, etc.).  
The present study will include two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants will 
be instructed to detect visual changes (the onset or offset of a positive, negative, or 
neutral object) as quickly and as accurately as possible. For each trial, participants will be 
presented with a fixation cross for 1,000 ms, followed by two images - each displayed for 
1,200 ms in succession, separated by a gray mask screen for 100 ms. One object 
(positive, negative, or neutral) will have changed (onset or offset) between the two 
images. Using a combination of neutral and emotional objects and different types of 
visual events, we can gain a better perspective regarding how top-down (i.e., SST 
motivations) and bottom-up (general emotional salience) processing impact change 
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detection ability, and what facets ultimately capture attention, within a more naturalistic 
environment. Because the detectability of a visual change may be based both on the 
valence of the changed object itself and whether it is appearing or disappearing from 
participants’ field of view, a second paradigm will be used to separately assess how 
emotionality is represented by the type of change and its ascribed emotional value as 
compared to the inherent emotionality of the object. Importantly, the design of 
Experiment 2 affords the ability to directly assess the influence of top-down goals on 
change detection ability. Experiment 1 is structured only to infer motivational 
mechanisms through Socioemotional Selectivity Theory based predictions (Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), but participants will not receive instructions beyond 
maintaining both speed and accuracy. Thus, in Experiment 2, the role of explicit 
motivation can be evaluated as a function of both valence and context. This design has 
the added benefit of rectifying the ambiguity surrounding top-down factors for offset 
trials and bottom-up factors for onset trials (Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, & Bucur, 2005; 
Costello, Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010), because each type of change has a 
different motivational value depending on whether the target represents something 
positive or negative. Thus, in Experiment 2, the procedure and presentation times will be 
identical as in the first experiment; however, the stimuli will be neutral, and emotionality 
will be manipulated by placing affective value onto the objects based on the type of 
change event (i.e., onset vs. offset). In this manner, a positive onset and negative offset 
are imbued with a “pleasant” affective value while positive offsets and negative onsets 
have an “unpleasant” affective value. Thus, emotionality, rather than being inherent to a 
particular object, is the product of the initially non-emotional object combined with its 
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relation to the observer. Using these paradigms, we should be able to demonstrate how 
sustained attentional flexibility across adulthood may function as an adaptive tool during 



































 In Experiment 1, older and younger adult participants were instructed to detect a 
changed object (positive, negative, or neutral; onset and offset) within a naturalistic scene 
with neutral distractors. Participants were instructed to detect the change as quickly and 
as accurately as possible, regardless of target valence or change type. That is, participants 
were not given explicit motivational instructions or asked to behave differently as a 
function of target valence.  
Predictions 
 Based on the aforementioned literature (Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2012; Yantis 
& Jonides, 1984), it is likely that both age groups will detect onsets with faster reaction 
times and higher accuracy compared to offsets; however, such an onset advantage may 
depend on object valence. Furthermore, it is also expected that older adults will be slower 
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than younger adults at detecting changes, but a main effect of age is not the focus of 
interest. There are several plausible patterns of results that may emerge in terms of 
emotional effects.  
Positivity effects. Given the extensive literature on positivity effects, findings 
from this study may provide evidence in support of positivity effects derived from 
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory. With evidence of positivity effects emerging within 
an early time course (starting at 500 ms), we might observe positivity effects in the 
present paradigm of 1,200 ms (Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009). While 
positivity effects often do not emerge until later on in processing, it is possible that such 
effects could emerge in the tasks used in the present study due to the memorial 
component of a change detection paradigm. Conversely, younger adults may be more 
vigilant to negative objects. As SST predicts that younger adults are likely more 
information-oriented, rather than positive-focused like older adults, younger adults often 
display a bias for negative relative to positive information (Rozin & Rozyman, 2001). 
Overall, an Age x Emotion interaction would likely be reflected in older adults exhibiting 
faster reaction times and higher accuracy on positive trials (here, positive trials could 
reflect a positive onset and/or a negative offset) compared to neutral or negative trials, 
and possibly younger adults exhibiting faster reaction times and higher accuracy to 
negative trials (which could be reflected in negative onsets and/or positive offsets) 
compared to neutral or positive trials.  
Negativity effects. Given the nature of a change detection task, failing to observe 
positivity effects would not be particularly surprising because the goal of the task is to 
detect the changed object as efficiently as possible. Reed and Carstensen (2012) argue 
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that positivity effects are most robust when no additional goal processes are relevant to 
the task, and no particular attentional instructions are given. Specifically, these 
researchers argue that positivity effects may not emerge if another behavioral goal 
overrides the SST-inspired goal of feeling as good as possible. Thus, it is possible that 
evidence for a negativity bias for both age groups could be revealed (i.e., reflected in 
response to negative onsets and/or positive offsets). The short presentation times and 
salience of negative items may support this possibility. Here, we could observe faster 
reaction times and higher accuracy for negative trials compared to neutral or positive 
trials due to the bottom-up saliency of negative information (Rauschenberger, 2003; Beck 
& Kastner, 2005). Additionally, locating a negative object alongside neutral distractors 
contributes to particularly efficient visual search, which could aid both younger and older 
adults in having faster reaction times and high accuracy on negative trials (Hahn, 
Carlson, Gronlund, & Singer, 2005; Mather & Knight, 2006).  
General emotional prioritization. Instead of a specific focus on positivity or 
negativity, a pattern of results could reflect general emotional salience that does not 
discriminate by valence. An emotional enhancement effect would mean a co-activation of 
bottom-up processing resources to detect negative salience and top-down processing 
resources to motivationally identify the positive (Carstensen & Turk-Charles, 1994). The 
time interval in the present study is sufficient for emotional prioritization to be observed 
(Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009). In this case, older adults could 
demonstrate a general facilitation of emotional change detection compared to their 
performance on neutral trials. Although both age groups may perform better on emotional 
trials compared to neutral ones, there could be within-group improvement by older adults 
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(Fung & Carstensen, 2003; Samanez-Larkin, Robertson, Mikels, Carstensen, & Gotlib, 
2009).  
Pilot Study 
The purpose of the pilot study was to ensure that ratings of positivity, negativity, 
and neutrality of the emotional objects were comparably evaluated by younger and older 
adults. Participants were presented with 75 objects (25 positive, 25 negative, 25 neutral) 
(see Appendix A for list of objects) and a corresponding ratings sheet. For each object, 
participants rated how positive, negative, and neutral the object was on a scale of 1-9 
with 1 indicating very negative, five indicating neutral, and 9 indicating very positive. 
Five older adults with an average age of 69.8 years from the Cleveland State University 
community and greater Cleveland area and five younger adults with an average age of 
18.4 years were recruited to participate in the pilot study. Older adults received monetary 
compensation at the rate of $5 per half hour, and younger adults received partial course 
credit at the rate of .5 credits for each half hour of participation. All participants had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
A 2 (Age: younger or older) x 3 (Valence: positive, negative, or neutral) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on ratings in the pilot study. The main 
effect of age was not significant, F (1, 8) = .64, p = .446,  = .074, indicating that older 
and younger adults did not differ significantly in their ratings of objects used in the main 
experiment. There was a main effect of Valence, F (2, 16), p < .001, = .958. A 
Bonferroni-corrected post hoc analysis on this effect revealed that mean ratings of 
positive, negative, and neutral objects all differed significantly from each other. Positive 







differed significantly from both negative, t(9) = 14.58, p < .001, d = 6.629 and neutral 
objects, t(9) = 9.31, p < .001, d = 2.822. Negative objects had an overall mean rating of 
2.40, (Myounger = 2.14, Molder = 2.67), and neutral objects had an overall mean rating of 
5.54 (Myounger = 5.42, Molder = 5.74), and negative and neutral differed significantly from 
each other as well, t(9) = 14.75, p < .001, d = 5.055. A paired samples t-test was also 
conducted on the difference scores of ratings of neutral objects compared to negative 
objects and positive objects compared to neutral objects to determine if the magnitude of 
intensity ratings differed significantly for positive and negative objects in comparison to 
neutral objects. The paired samples t-test indicated that ratings for negative objects 
compared to neutral objects (M = 2.75, SD = .56) were significantly more intense than 
positive objects were compared to neutral objects (M = 1.97, SD = .73), t(9) = 3.23, p = 
.010, d = 1.040. Because positive objects overall were less intense on the positive scale 
than negative objects on the negative scale, the five objects with the lowest positive 
ratings were excluded from the experiment, as were the five neutral objects with the 
highest ratings and the 5 negative objects with the lowest ratings. Neutral objects 
excluded from the experiment had an overall mean rating of 6.60 (Myounger = 6.56, Molder = 
6.64), positive objects excluded from the experiment had an overall mean rating of 5.96 
(Myounger = 5.92, Molder = 6.00), and negative objects excluded from the experiment had an 
overall mean rating of 1.68 (Myounger = 1.28, Molder = 2.08). No significant interactions 
emerged for the ratings data.  
Main Experiment 
Participants. Twenty older adults ranging in age from 60 to 87 (M = 68.3, SD = 
6.55) from the Cleveland State University community and greater Cleveland area and 20 
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younger adults ranging in age from 18 to 30 (M  = 20.4, SD = 3.45) were recruited to 
participate in this study. In a preliminary study, an a priori power analysis was conducted 
based on an effect size of .172 for the interaction of Trial Type and Instructional 
Condition (Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2016). By setting an alpha level of .05 and power of 
.8 to .95, 16 to 23 participants were needed per group. Thus, recruitment of 20 
participants per age group for the present study should have been sufficient (Donaldson 
& Yamamoto, 2016).  
Participants’ demographic information was also collected. The older adult sample 
consisted of seven men and 13 women. For older adults, 30% were African American, 
65% were Caucasian, and 5% were Hispanic. For handedness, 85% of older adults 
reported right hand dominance, 10% reported left hand dominance, and 5% were 
ambidextrous. The average years of formal education for the older adults was 16.05 
years, which approximately corresponds to attainment of a Bachelor’s degree. The 
younger adult sample also consisted of seven men and 13 women. For younger adults, 
15% were African American, 25% were Asian or Middle Eastern, 40% were Caucasian, 
15% were Hispanic, and 10% chose not to provide this information. In the younger adult 
sample, 100% of participants reported right hand dominance. The average years of formal 
education for the younger adults was 13.75 years, which corresponds approximately to 
the second year of college.  
Participants completed a series of mood and cognitive measures to assess whether 
scores on mood and cognitive inventories accounted for age differences on our main 
variables of interest. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegan, 1988) was used to assess positive and negative affect prior to the 
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experimental tasks; the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression (CESD-D; 
Radloff, 1977) scale was used to asses symptoms of depression; the trait subscale of the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 
1983) was proctored to examine anxiety symptomology; and the SLUMS inventory 
(SLUMS; Tariq, Tumosa, Chibnall, Perry, & Morley, 2006) was administered to gauge 
basic cognitive functioning. A cognitive battery designed to assess frontal lobe 
functioning, consisting of the FAS generative task, mental arithmetic, backward digit 
span task, and mental control task was also administered (Glisky, Polster, & Routhieaux, 
1995), as well as the Shipley vocabulary test (Zachary, 1986). Cognitive questionnaires 
were administered prior to the affective questionnaires in order to prevent potential 
activation of cognitive ability from negatively influencing participants’ performance on 
the main tasks. Older adults received monetary compensation of $5 per half hour of 
participation, and younger adults received .5 research credits per half hour of 
participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.  
Materials. Experimental stimuli were color digital photographs depicting kitchen 
scenes, as this environment is commonly encountered by individuals of all age groups. 
Six different kitchen scenes were used an equal number of times to avoid habituation 
effects that may occur if the same scene was used for 120 trials. A positive scene, for 
example, consisted of the appearance of a dessert tray or the disappearance of rotting 
food; a negative scene, for example, consisted of the appearance of rotting food or the 
disappearance of a dessert tray; and a neutral scene consisted of the appearance or 
disappearance of a kitchen utensil. All non-target items were neutrally valanced. Stimuli 
were created using Adobe Photoshop and presented using ePrime 3.0 (Psychology 
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Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Each scene contained objects typically found in a 
kitchen environment, and the set size varied from six to 15 objects to avoid predictability 
of whether the trial consisted of an onset or an offset. The objects were arranged such that 














Figure 1a. This is an example of a stimulus trial for Experiment 1 that contains a 





Figure 1b. This is an example of a stimulus trial for Experiment 1 that contains a 
negative target. Here, the spider on the right of this image is the target. 
 
Figure 1c. This is an example of a stimulus trial for Experiment 1 that contains a 
neutral target. Here, the umbrella on the left of this image is the target. 
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Images were presented on a 22-inch computer monitor. The screen was positioned 
vertically in front of the participant. The distance between the participant and the screen 
was approximately 60 cm. The images were presented so as to occupy the entire screen. 
When presented on the screen, the center of the scene was approximately at the center of 
the screen so that the left and right halves of the scene corresponded to those of the 
screen (see the appendix for the objects used in this Experiment). 
Design. Participants began with a short practice session of 16 trials. Stimuli used 
in the practice session were unique photographs that were not repeated in subsequent 
blocks. These manipulations ensured that participants were not influenced by any 
adventitious priming effects resulting from seeing particular objects or configurations in 
photographs more frequently (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 1998).  
Following the practice session, participants were presented with a block of 120 
trials, each depicting a series of photograph pairs. The two photographs of each pair 
depicted the same object configuration, but one change occurred between them—a new 
object appeared in the second photograph (onset), or one of the objects in the first 
photograph disappeared going into the second photograph (offset).  One onset trial and 
one offset trial were created from the same two photographs by reversing the order of 
their presentation. This manipulation ensured that the identical visual characteristics were 
present for both onset and offset trials. The onset and offset trials were randomly 
intermixed. Each object was used the same number of times to create an onset trial or an 
offset trial throughout the experiment (i.e., all objects were presented an equal number of 
times throughout the experiment).  
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The task was to detect the change between the photographs as accurately and 
quickly as possible by indicating with a button press whether the change occurred on the 
right half or the left half of the scene. The location of the change was counterbalanced 
such that the changed object occurred on the left and right side of the scene an equal 
number of times. There were 40 positive trials, 40 negative trials, and 40 neutral trials. 
There were 40 trials with a low set size, 40 trials with a medium set size, and 40 trials 
with a high set size. The objects and side of the screen on which the change occurred was 
also counterbalanced.  
Procedure. This experiment used the same procedure as in Donaldson and 
Yamamoto (2012), which adopted the one-shot flicker paradigm developed by Cole et al. 
(2003). Participants sat in front of a computer screen, centered in front of a keyboard. The 
participants were told that they would view a series of photograph pairs in which an 
object would change between two images of each pair. Participants were instructed that 
the change would be either an onset of a new object or an offset of an existing object. 
Participants were instructed to press either the “F” key if the change occurs on the left or 
the “J” key if the change occurs on the right side of the screen. Participants used their left 
index finger to press the left button and their right index finger to press the right button. 
Participants did not have to report whether the trial represented an onset or an offset trial. 
Participants were cautioned to be as quick, but as accurate as possible.  
During each trial, participants first viewed a fixation cross for 1,000 ms that was 
presented at the center of the screen. Participants were instructed to keep fixating on the 
cross while it was displayed and maintain their fixation around the same area after the 
cross disappeared. Participants then viewed a first image for 1,200 ms. This image was 
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followed by a 100-ms gray screen that produced a one-shot flicker of the scene. The 
second image was then displayed for 1,200 ms. At the onset of the second image, 
participants were allowed to make a button press indicating on which side of the screen 
they believe the change occurred if they had noticed it. Following the presentation of the 
second image, the second gray screen was displayed and remained on the screen until the 
participant made his or her response or until 3,000 ms has passed. Reaction time was 
recorded between the appearance of the second image and the participant’s button press. 
Accuracy in the left/right judgment was also measured based on participants’ button press 
response. When the participant made an error in the left/right judgment, reaction time 









Figure 2. The trial sequence for Experiment 1. This represents a positive onset 
trial, in which the flowerpot (positive target) appears on the right in the second 
image. By reversing the order of the presentation, the same image pair could 












Data analyses. Data were analyzed via a 2 (Age: younger or older) x 3 (Valence: 
positive, negative, or neutral) x 2 (Trial type: onset or offset) mixed ANOVA, in which 
age was a between participant factor and valence and trial type were within participant 
factors. Although we controlled for set size, set size was not included in the main 
analysis, because the function of set size was only to eliminate attentional capture by trial 
type predictability, and was not of central interest. Separate analyses were conducted for 
reaction time and accuracy. 
Results 
 No participants were excluded from the analyses for having mean accuracy in the 
left/right judgment task for either onset or offset trials more than three standard 
deviations from the mean of all participants. However, aberrant reaction times were 
removed at the trial level for each participant that exceeded three standard deviations 
from the mean for that participant. This method of outlier analysis was used in previous 
studies (e.g. Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2016) and less than 1-2% of trials in 11 younger 
adults, and less than 1-2% of trials in 14 older adults were removed in the present study. 
Analyses did not differ substantially with or without outliers.  
 Covariates. On the Positive Affect Schedule, older adults (M = 39.25, SD = 4.42) 
reported significantly higher positive affect compared to younger adults (M = 34.10, SD = 
6.91), t(38) = -2.81, p = .008, and on the Negative Affect Schedule, older adults (M = 
12.90, SD = 2.77) reported significantly lower negative affect than younger adults (M = 
16.35, SD = 5.37), t(38) = 2.55, p = .015 (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1988). On 
the CESD-D, older adults (M = 5.60, SD = 4.75) reported significantly lower depressive 
symptomology than younger adults (M = 14.30,  SD = 10.18), t(38) = 3.46, p = .001 
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(CESD-D; Radloff, 1977). On the STAI, older adults (M = 29.40, SD = 5.09) reported 
significantly lower anxiety compared to younger adults (M = 37.30, SD = 8.43), t(38) = 
3.59, p = .001 (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Older 
adults (M = 25.65, SD = 2.96) and younger adults (M = 25.20, SD = 3.25) did not differ 
significantly on the SLUMS inventory for basic cognitive functioning, t(38) = -.46, p = 
.650 (SLUMS; Tariq, Tumosa, Chibnall, Perry, & Morley, 2006). On the Shipley 
vocabulary test, older adults (M = 34.50, SD = 5.15) scored significantly higher than 
younger adults (M = 26.95, SD = 3.63), t(38) = -5.36, p < .001. Older adults (M = -.08, 
SD = 1.55) did not differ significantly from younger adults (M = -.35, SD = 1.39) on 
composite front lobe cognitive functioning scores, t(38) = -.58, p = .565 (Glisky, Polster, 
& Routhieaux, 1995). Thus, younger and older adults from this sample had comparable 
cognitive capacities, which given the level of education and nature of this experiment, is 
in line with what would be expected from this older adult sample. Results of these 
analyses indicate what is generally expected in the literature on emotion and cognition in 
terms of age profiles on these variables. Importantly, when included as covariates in the 
main analyses, STAI, CESD-D, Shipley, PA, and NA scores had no significant effect on 
the main dependent variables of interest.  
 Reaction time data. There was a main effect of Age, such that reaction times for 
younger adults were significantly quicker than for older adults, F (1, 38) = 15.59, p < 
.001, = .291. There was also a significant main effect of Trial type, F (1, 38) = 44.99, 
p < .001, = - .542, wherein reaction times for offsets were significantly quicker than 
reaction times for onset trials, suggesting greater offset primacy. The sphericity 







correction was used for this variable. There was a significant main effect of Valence, F 
(1.458, 76) = 7.04, p = .005, = .156. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc analyses revealed 
that reaction times for positive trials were significantly quicker than reaction times for 
both negative, t(38) = 2.812, p = .023, d = 1.540, and neutral trials, t(38) = 3.032, p = 
.013, d = 1.483, and negative and neutral trials did not differ significantly from each 
other, t(38) = .888, p = 1.000, d = .321. The main effect of Valence was qualified by a 
marginally significant interaction between Valence and Trial type, F(2, 76) = 2.823, p = 
.066, = .069. A simple effects analysis revealed that for onset trials, positive trials 
were detected more quickly than either negative, t(38) = 4.88, p < .001, d = 2.520, or 
neutral trials, t(38) = 4.46, p < .001, d = 1.653, but negative and neutral trials did not 
differ significantly from each other, t(38) = 2.24, p = .093, d = .804. For offset trials, 
positive, negative, and neutral trials did not differ significantly from each other. No other 
main effects or interactions were significant. 
 As noted in the Predictions section, a positive trial could either be construed as a 
positive onset or a negative offset, while a negative trial could either be construed as a 
negative onset or a positive offset. Thus, to provide a more sensitive assessment of 
positivity vs. negativity preferences, variables were created to further interrogate the 
interplay between participant Valence and Trial type variables. A 2 (Age: young vs. old) 
x 3 (Valence/Trial type: positive onset/ negative offset, negative onset/ positive offset, 
neutral) Analysis of Variance was conducted separately for reaction time and accuracy 
data. For reaction time, there was still a main effect of Age, F (1, 38) = 15.59, p < .001, 









 = .097, whereby positive trials, both positive onsets and negative offsets, were 
detected more quickly than neutral trials, t(38) = 2.96, p = .016, d = .890. Negative trials 
did not differ significantly from positive trials or neutral trials. See Figure 3a for reaction 
time data for the main ANOVA and Figure 3b for the follow up analysis.   
 Accuracy data. There was a main effect of Age, such that younger adults 
exhibited significantly higher accuracy than older adults, F (1, 38) = 22.88, p < .001, = 
.376. No other main effects or interactions were significant. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence of any speed-accuracy trade-offs. The same follow up analysis used to 
understand the interplay between Trial type and Valence variables was conducted for 
accuracy as well. Again, a main effect of Age emerged whereby younger adults were 
significantly more accurate than older adults, F (1, 38) = 22.88, p < .001,  = .376, but 
















Figure 3a. Reaction time data for Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors of 




































Figure 3b. Reaction time data for Experiment 1 in which positive trials are comprised of 
positive onsets and negative offsets and negative trials are comprised of negative onsets 
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Experiment 1 Discussion 
 Results of Experiment 1 highlight two main findings. First, given the extensive 
literature on age-related positivity effects, it was possible that findings from this study 
could have provided evidence in support of Socioemotional Selectivity Theory given the 
time course for the stimulus presentations used (i.e., within 1,200 ms; see Isaacowitz et 
al., 2009). While positivity effects often do not emerge until later on in processing, such 
effects could have emerged in the tasks used in the present study due to the memorial 
component of a change detection paradigm. However, in order for findings from the 
present study to support positivity effects as predicted by Socioemotional Selectivity 
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), an Age x Valance interaction, in which older 
adults exhibited faster reaction times and/or higher accuracy on positive trials (here, 
positive trials could reflect a positive onset and/or a negative offset) compared to neutral 
or negative trials, or possibly in which younger adults exhibited quicker reaction times 
and/or higher accuracy to negative trials (which could be reflected in negative onsets 
and/or positive offsets) compared to neutral or positive trials was not observed in the 
present study. In fact, we found evidence of greater positive preferences across the entire 
sample, as both younger and older adults were much faster at detecting positive targets, 
relative to negative and neutral targets.   
 Older adults may have a cognitively motivated desire to optimize well-being 
(Mather & Carstensen, 2003); thus, the enhanced positive preferences observed are 
somewhat in line with SST predictions. However, SST would also predict that younger 
adults would be less positive focused due to the supposition that younger adults are likely 
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more information-oriented and vigilant toward the negative (Rozin & Rozyman, 2001); 
this did not appear to be the case based on the present results.  
  There are two possible explanations for this pattern of results in which positive 
preferences emerged for both younger and older adults. One possibility is that we 
recruited a particularly happy and emotionally well-adjusted sample of younger adults. 
However, the PANAS, STAI, and CES-D data obtained from the present sample would 
indicate that both our young adult and older adult sample were representative of what 
would be expected for both age groups, with older adults demonstrating higher levels of 
PA, and lower levels of NA, depressive symptomology, and anxiety symptomology in 
comparison to the younger adult sample (Carstensen et al., 2011).  
 The second potential explanation, then, is to consider the stimuli that were used in 
this experiment, as well as how they were employed. To review, stimuli used in the pilot 
study for Experiment 1 were chosen as potential objects that could feasibly exist in a 
typical kitchen environment but that had some affective component (aside from the 
neutral objects). We did not control for size, contrast, or luminance, as these naturally 
vary with objects that occur in naturalistic scenes. Thus, some objects were larger and 
more colorful than others. This may have contributed to the noticeability of some objects 
over and above other objects. However, the important constraint was the believability of 
the object for the purpose of assessing how observers respond to changes in a more 
natural change detection paradigm. In that respect, objects were also only placed in parts 
of the scene where they could theoretically exist. For example, a water bottle cannot 
float, so it was placed on the kitchen counter.  
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 Interestingly, in the pilot study, positive objects were actually rated as less intense 
on the positive scale, compared to negative objects on the negative scale. Despite this 
potential limitation, the onset of a positive object was particularly noticeable, as revealed 
in the Valence by Trial type interaction. Perceptual features of positive objects may have 
been particularly salient when appearing in the scene; positive object color and size 
compared to the negative may have enhanced the noticeability of positive objects during 
onset trials.  
 Importantly, in the main ANOVA, an overwhelming offset advantage also 
emerged. To fully understand the processing advantage of positive onsets, it is critical to 
concomitantly consider the other main finding from Experiment 1 concerning the main 
effect of Trial type. Despite considerable research supporting onset primacy (e.g. 
Brockmole & Henderson, 2005; Cole, Kentridge, Gellatly, & Heywood; Donaldson & 
Yamamoto, 2012), overall, offsets were detected with quicker reaction times in the 
present study. Donaldson and Yamamoto (2016) found that despite providing participants 
with both implicit and explicit manipulations in order to activate both top-down and 
bottom-up processing resources, onset primacy is a rather robust phenomenon, and it was 
only with the combination of top-down and bottom-up processing that an onset advantage 
disappeared. However, a true offset primacy never emerged. One possible explanation I 
propose for the pattern of results obtained in the Donaldson and Yamamoto study was 
that the objects were all neutrally valenced and the instructions given were purely 
attentional. In contrast, in the present study, the only instruction given was to respond 
both as quickly and as accurately as possible, but the objects differed in emotional 
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quality. Thus, with neither an explicit nor implicit attentional motivation, an offset 
primacy emerged given the emotional nature of this task. 
 In the supplementary analysis that was conducted in which positive trials were 
comprised of positive onsets and negative offsets and negative trials were comprised of 
negative onsets and positive offsets, another processing advantage was for “positive” 
trials relative to neutral ones. That is, both younger and older adults were paying 
particular attention to the onset of a positive object and the offset of a negative object. 
Although the overall processing advantage was for offset trials, as indicated by faster 
reaction times, the main effect of Trial type also appears to be driven by positivity upon 
consideration of the supplementary analysis results.  
 Importantly, the change detection paradigm used in this study allows for this 
disentanglement of emotion not only being inherent to an object but also a product of 
what that object represents. Attentional capture by positive onsets and negative offsets 
occur as a function of different underlying mechanisms, so it is actually quite interesting 
how dominating positivity was in the present study. This point actually speaks to the 
preservation of an interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing resources in 
later life (Yantis, 2005), given the lack of age interactions. Processing emotional 
information involves both exogenous and endogenous attentional control. In typical 
change detection paradigms, onset detection is largely a product of exogenous attentional 
streams, as attention can quickly be commanded by bottom-up processing resources to 
new and potentially salient visual events (Theeuwes, 2004). During emotional object 
change detection, exogenous attentional capture is a distinct possibly, especially in cases 
of threat. However, when demands for attention are low, people can volitionally engage 
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with the environment, and emotions could guide this interaction via exogenous control 
(Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004; Rolls, 2008). Detection of a positive onset may be 
partially driven by a motivated desire to maintain positive affect and regulate emotions 
for older adults (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), so there may be some degree 
of top-down processing involved; however, because younger adults showed the same 
pattern of results, for onset trials, detection may also largely be dependent on bottom-up 
processing resources. In past research, the newness of an onset has a processing 
advantage because until it is attended, it is unclear whether or not that event will require 
us to react in some important, adaptive way (Cole, Kentridge, & Heywood, 2004). Rapid 
detection of positive onsets would be more in line with the pattern of results typically 
seen in past change detection studies because the new positive object pops out in the 
second image. However, negative offsets operate differently, even though the valence 
categorization within these two trial types is equivalent. Detection of negative offsets 
commands bottom-up processing because negative objects tend to be salient; thus, 
participants’ attentional resources may have made them quickly aware of the presence of 
a negative object in the first image (Theeuwes, 2004). Even though in this trial type the 
negative object was not the ultimate target (rather the space in the second image where 
the negative object was initially located) its temporary presence may have still 
commanded observers’ attention in a meaningful way. The challenging part of this task is 
the memorial component involved with offset trials, which makes any kind of offset 
advantage rather impressive. Yet, in this study, there was a robust offset advantage. One 
mechanism typically driving onset primacy observed in the visual attention literature is 
the “pop out” effect in which the target differs from non-target distractors on details such 
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as size, orientation, or luminance (Nothdurft, 2000). Because of efforts to control for 
object “belongingness” within the kitchen scenes, it may be the case that the traditional 
bottom-up pop-out effect associated with onsets was dampened in this paradigm. If 
onsets were less noticeable than typical, detection of offsets may have been more 
noticeable than usual. Regardless, offset detection can still be quite challenging. 
Participants must remember the arrangement of the previous display, and correctly 
identify the location of the screen where the target was located during the first image. In 
this way, this task also requires intact top-down processing resources, which was 
demonstrated by both the younger and older adult sample, due to the lack of an observed 
Age x Trial type interaction.  
 Results of this experiment demonstrate that one way to activate (or motivate) our 
attentional system is through emotion, even without an explicit motivational instruction. 
The lack of predictability from the first image to the second image was a strength in the 
sense that this design more closely resembles naturally occurring change detection 
scenarios people may encounter. However, this also made for a rather challenging task. 
We were able to observe successful maintenance of older adults’ flexible use of bottom-
up and top-down processing resources to facilitate change detection ability. However, 
without seeing meaningful age effects regarding positive preferences, the true effect of 
emotion and visual trial type on change detection ability is not resolved following this 
initial experiment. Thus, in Experiment 2, we more carefully addressed the role of 
emotion on change detection ability by not only considering the combined effects of 
Valence and Trial type (i.e., the similar valence of a positive onset and negative), but also 
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Experiment 1 investigated how the emotionality of objects may differentially 
impact older and younger adults’ ability to detect onset and offset changes in scenes. 
Results indicated that older and younger adults were both particularly adept at processing 
positive-oriented trials. In contrast to assessing change detection of objects imbued with 
emotional value, emotionality can also be ascribed to a scene based on what a particular 
object represents. For instance, objects (e.g., store merchandise) may not have inherent 
emotional value, but when they disappear (e.g., shoplifted from a store), their offset could 
be emotionally evocative (i.e., distressing). In Experiment 1, we were able to assess this 
implied effect of positivity and negativity crossed between onset and offset; however, in 
Experiment 2, we made this interaction between Valence and Trial type explicit to 
participants.  If all the changes are imbued with top-down affective components, we can 
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further interrogate the motivational nature of change detection abilities for younger and 
older adults in this type of paradigm.  
Thus, considering the emotional context of scenes is critical to understanding how 
individuals behave with change detection in their daily lives. The purpose of Experiment 
2 was to delineate how an emotional component may motivate behavior, and if the 
motivation differs between younger and older adults. Many occasions requiring change 
detection in our everyday environment are infused with emotional relevance. The object 
that must be detected in those instances may not convey emotionality in isolation, but 
within the context, its detection is critical. For example, a trash can, in essence, likely 
would not convey emotional meaning on its own. However, if it rolls onto the sidewalk in 
front of your child, who is riding a bike, that object now becomes highly emotionally 
relevant. Noticing and reacting to that stimulus becomes critical to ensuring the child’s 
safety.  
 Most situations involving change detection represent one of four different 
scenarios. If an object with a positive salience (e.g., new puppy) is an onset, this situation 
is construed as pleasant. If a positive object (e.g., new puppy) disappears from a scene, 
this could be distressing. A negative object entering a scene (e.g., aggressive dog) may 
illustrate a threat; and lastly, a negative object disappearing from a scene (e.g., aggressive 
dog) could represent relief. Thus, in a change detection paradigm, the same object could 
be valued as either positive or negative depending on situational factors; similarly, the 
same visual event could carry either positive or negative salience depending on the value 
of the object. In the present study, we tested four motivational scenarios to represent each 
type of visual event. Determining which of these scenarios has the greatest influence on 
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performance in this task should provide us with a better understanding of what affective 
events are prioritized within specific affective contexts.  
Predictions 
 Positivity effects. If there is evidence for positivity effects, there may be faster 
reaction times and higher accuracy for pleasant and relief conditions compared to 
distress, threat, and control conditions for older adults, similar to what was observed for 
Experiment 1. Alternatively, younger adults may exhibit faster reaction times and higher 
accuracy for distress and threat conditions compared to pleasant, relief, and control 
conditions. In Experiment 1, both younger and older adults displayed positive 
preferences, as demonstrated by faster reaction times on positive onset and negative 
offset trials. Even though younger adults exhibited positive preferences in Experiment 1, 
by providing the explicit emotional motivations to participants in Experiment 2 and using 
different stimuli, it is still possible that younger adults may have an age-related negativity 
bias. 
 Negativity effects. Given the short presentation times, a negativity bias may 
emerge for both younger and older adults. In this case, reaction times will be faster and 
accuracy higher for distress and threat conditions, compared to pleasant, relief, and 
neutral conditions. Even though Experiment 1 contained negative objects that either 
appeared (negative onset) or disappeared (positive offset), the overall context of the 
kitchen scene in which these changes occurred might not have fully conveyed a 
threatening or relieving environment. By using top-down emotional motivations to 
represent the different affective and attentional scenarios, we may be more likely to 
observe negativity effects for both age groups in the present study 
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 General emotional prioritization. If an emotional preference is observed, then 
reaction times will be faster and accuracy higher for pleasant, relief, distress, and threat 
conditions compared the baseline condition. This emotional preference could be observed 
for younger and older adults. Even though a general emotional preference was not 
observed in Experiment 1, the different stimuli, and changing emotional context used in 
Experiment 2, could alter the processing of these objects in a manner different from what 
was noted in Experiment 1.  
Pilot Study 
The purpose of the pilot study was to choose the most motivating emotional 
context scenarios for Experiment 2. Participants were presented with 5 scenarios that 
were potentially pleasant (positive onset), 5 that were potentially distressing (positive 
offset), 5 that represented potential threat (negative onset), and 5 that represented 
potential relief (negative offset). Participants completed the task individually. Participants 
were instructed to order the 5 scenarios within each type of change from most motivating 
to least motivating. Each scenario naturally had the potential for both onsets and offsets, 
but for that situation, it was clear whether onsets or offsets were more crucial to notice. 
The scenario that was most commonly motivating for each type of change across age 
groups was used in Experiment 2. A stargazing situation in which the goal was to notice a 
shooting star entering the sky was chosen for the pleasant scenario (Myoung = 4.4, SDyoung 
= .89; Mold = 4.4, SDold = .55). Participants rated a driving situation, in which the goal 
was to detect new cars appearing on the road that may endanger safety, as most evocative 
for the threat scenario, (Myoung = 5.0, SDyoung = .00; Mold = 4.8, SDold = .45). A description 
of maintaining vigilance over children at a daycare center in case one of the children goes 
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missing was chosen for the distress situation (Myoung = 4.2, SDyoung = .84; Mold = 4.4, SDold 
= .55). Lastly, an armed intruder scenario was rated as most evocative for the relief 
scenario, as the goal was to notice that the intruder had left the scene (Myoung = 5.0, 
SDyoung = .00; Mold = 4.6, SDold = .55). A 2 (Age: younger or older) x 4 (Scenario: 
pleasant, threat, distress, or relief) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on 
ratings data in which age was a between participants factor and scenario was a within 
participants factor. The main effect of age was not significant, F(1, 8) = .27, p = .620,  
= .032, suggesting that these scenarios were rated as equivalently motivating across age 
groups. The main effect of scenario was not significant, F(3, 24) = 2.81, p = .061, = 
.260, suggesting that the scenarios were equally motivating. The interaction of age and 
scenario was also not significant, F (3, 24) = .54, p = .659,  = .063. Descriptions of the 
scenarios used in Experiment 2 can be found in the Appendix.  
Main Experiment  
Participants. The participant sample for Experiment 2 was identical to that of 
Experiment 1. The order of experiments was counterbalanced across participants to 
account for potential carryover effects following completion of the mood and cognitive 
questionnaires.  
Materials. Experimental stimuli were colored, 2-dimensional shapes on a solid 
grey background (see Figure 4 for example stimuli). These stimuli were created using 
Microsoft PowerPoint, and were presented using ePrime 3.0 (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA). The set size varied from six dots to 11 shapes. In this manner, 
participants were not able to predict whether an onset or offset occurred during the trial 









equal number of times, were present on each side of the screen an equal number of times, 
and were the target an equal number of times. The shapes were arranged such that half 
were on the right side of the screen, and half were on the left side of the screen. Images 
were presented on a 22-inch liquid crystal display and occupied the entire screen. The 
screen was positioned vertically in front of the participant. The distance between the 















Figure 4. This image represents sample stimuli for Experiment 2. This image 
contains 10 objects. It is possible that the next image may have either 9 or 11 
objects, thereby eliminating the risk of change detection simply by counting the 












Design. Participants were exposed to all four change detection scenarios (one 
scenario per block); however they were randomly assigned to one of four 
counterbalanced orders, so that we could assess how different emotional contexts would 
motivate behavior for each participant. A Latin Square design was used to develop the 
four counterbalanced orders: 1. Pleasant, Threat, Distress, Relief; 2. Threat, Relief, 
Pleasant, Distress; 3. Distress, Pleasant, Relief, Threat; 4. Relief, Distress, Threat, 
Pleasant. All experimental sessions began with a short practice session of 16 trials (eight 
onsets, eight offsets) in which no contextual motivation was given. This was to ensure 
that participants were able to notice an onset and offset in this paradigm. Stimuli used in 
the practice session were different from stimuli used in the actual experimental 
conditions.  
Following the practice session, participants completed a baseline control 
condition in which their only instruction was to respond as quickly and accurately as 
possible to onsets and offsets. The baseline control condition was the same length as the 
other four experimental blocks and was used as a comparison against the other four 
blocks. Following this condition, participants then went through each of the four 
conditions, the order of which was counterbalanced. Each condition began with a 
scenario describing how the shapes should be conceptualized for that block of trials. 
Participants completed the same 60 trials (30 onsets and 30 offsets) for each of 4 blocks 
(and the control block), for a total of 300 trials. The same 60 trials were used in each of 
the blocks, but the order was randomized across participants and within each block. Other 
studies (i.e., Veiel, Storandt, & Abrams, 2006) have used 100-200 trials per condition, 
but given the emotional nature of this task and to avoid participant fatigue, this number of 
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trials should have been sufficient. The context determining how they respond to these 
blocks, however, was different. In each trial, participants viewed a pair of images 
presented in succession, depicting a shape display. One change occurred between them—
a new shape appeared in the second image (onset), or one of the shapes in the first 
photograph disappeared in the second image (offset).  One onset trial and one offset trial 
were created from the same two images by reversing the order of their presentation. This 
manipulation ensured that the identical visual characteristics were present during both 
onset and offset trials. The onset and offset trials were randomly intermixed. At the onset 
of each new block of 60 trials, participants were presented with one of four instructions, 
based on the results of the pilot study to orient them to the emotional context of the 
environment. These represented the four combinations of negative and positive valence 
with onset and offset trials. 
The task was to detect the change between the shape displays as accurately and 
quickly as possible by indicating whether the change occurred in the right half or the left 
half of the scene. The location of the change was counterbalanced such that the changed 
object occurred on the left and right side of the scene an equal number of times. 
Procedure. Participants sat in front of a computer screen, centered in front of a 
keyboard. Participants were then told that they would view a series of image pairs in 
which a shape would either be added (onset) to the second image, or deleted (offset) from 
the first image. In the neutral control block, participants were not given a motivational 
instruction to respond in a particular way. However, in each of the four subsequent 
experimental blocks, participants were given a motivational instruction indicating how 
onsets and offsets should be conceptualized for those trials. Importantly, both onsets and 
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offsets were plausible for each of these stimuli, but one trial type carries more affective 
weight than the other type of change in each context. Participants were instructed to press 
either the “F” key if the change occurred on the left or the “J” key if the change occurred 
on the right side of the screen. Participants used their left index finger to press the left 
button and their right index finger to press the right button. They were cautioned to be as 
quick, but as accurate as possible. Participants did not have to report whether the change 
was an onset or an offset. 
For each trial, participants first viewed a fixation cross for 1,000 ms that was 
presented at the center of the screen. Participants were instructed to keep fixating on the 
cross while it was displayed and maintain their fixation around the same area after the 
cross disappeared.  Participants then viewed a first image for 1,200 ms. This image was 
followed by a 100-ms gray screen that produced a one-shot flicker of the scene. The 
second image was then displayed for 1,200 ms. At the onset of the second image, 
participants could make a button press indicating on which side of the screen they believe 
the change occurred. Following the presentation of the second image, if a response had 
not yet been made, a second gray screen was displayed and remained on the screen until 
the participant made his or her response or until 3,000 ms had passed. Reaction time was 
recorded between the appearance of the second image and the participant’s button press. 
Accuracy for the left/right judgment was also measured based on participants’ button 
press response. When the participant made an error in the left/right judgment, reaction 








Figure 5. The trial sequence for Experiment 2. This example represents an onset 
trial, in which the green oval appears on the right in the second image. By 
reversing the order of the presentation, the same image pair could represent an 
offset trial. The valence of this image depends on the motivational scenario that is 









Data analyses. Data were analyzed via a 2 (Age: younger or older) x 2 (Trial 
type: onset or offset) x 5 (Scenario: baseline, pleasant, distress, threat, relief) mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) in which Age was a between participant factor and Trial 
type and Scenario were within participant factors. Set size was used to eliminate the 
prediction of trial type based on the number of objects in a scene but was not included in 
the omnibus ANOVA. Separate ANOVAs were conducted for reaction time and 
accuracy.  
Results 
 No participants were excluded from the analyses using listwise deletion for 
having a mean accuracy in the left/right judgment task for either onset or offset trials 
more than three standard deviations away from the mean of all participants. Aberrant 
reaction times for each participant were removed at the trial level exceeding three 
standard deviations away from the mean for each individual participant. This method of 
outlier analysis removed less than 1-2% of trials in seven younger adults, and less than 1-
2% of trials in nine older adults (Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2016).  
 Covariates. Again, analyses of the affective and cognitive measures indicated 
what is generally expected in the literature on emotion and cognition in terms of age 
profiles on these variables. Importantly, when included as covariates in the main 
analyses, STAI, CESD-D, Shipley, PA, and NA had no significant effect on the 
dependent variables.  
 Reaction time data. There was a main effect of Age, such that older adults had 
significantly slower reaction times compared to younger adults, F(1, 38) = 52.48, p < 





22.77, p = .007, nor the Scenario x Trial type interaction, Χ2(9) = 19.79, p = .019; thus, 
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used for these effects. There was a main effect of 
Trial type, F (1, 152) = 39.82, p < .001,  = .512, in which onsets were detected 
significantly faster than offsets. There was a main effect of Scenario, F(3.159, 152) = 
5.37, p = .001, = .124. Follow-up analyses revealed that the threat scenario yielded 
significantly quicker reaction times compared to the baseline condition, p = .005, but not 
compared to pleasant, p = .896, distress, p = .664, or relief, p = 1.000. The interaction of 
Scenario and Trial type was significant, F (3.112, 152) = 3.94, p = .009. Simple effects 
analyses of the Scenario and Trial type interaction revealed that for offset trials, reaction 
time was significantly faster in the threat condition compared to baseline, p = .002 and in 
the relief condition compared to baseline, p = .003, but not for pleasant, p = .057, or 
distress, p = .075, compared to baseline. Based on simple effects, the motivational 
scenarios did not differ amongst each other, p = 1.000. Furthermore, simple effects 
analyses of the Scenario and Trial type interaction revealed that onsets were detected 
significantly faster than offset trials in the baseline condition, p <.001, pleasant condition, 
p = .001, and threat condition, p < .001, but there were no significant differences between 
onset and offset trials in the distress, p = .115, and relief condition, p = .450. No other 
interactions were significant. 
  A 2 (Age: younger or older) x 4 (Order: 1, 2, 3, 4) x 5 (Scenario: baseline, 
pleasant, distress, threat, relief) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on 
reaction time data to determine if order effects were significant, in which age and order 
were between participant factors, and scenario was a within participant factors. The main 









age and order was also not significant, F(3, 32) = .14, p = .936, = .013, indicating that 
order did not affect participants differently depending on age.  See Figure 6a for a graph 
of reaction time results.  
 Accuracy data. There were no significant differences in accuracy between 
younger and older adults, F(1, 38) = .12, p = .737, = .003. The main effect of Scenario 
was not significant, F(4, 152) = 2.09, p = .084,  = .052. The main effect of trial type 
was significant, F (1, 38) = 17.12, p < .001,  = .311, in which participants were 
significantly more accurate on offset trials compared to onset trials. A 2 (Age: younger or 
older) x 4 (Order: 1, 2, 3, 4) x 5 (Scenario: baseline, pleasant, distress, threat, relief) 
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on accuracy data as well to 
determine if order effects were significant, in which age and order were between 
participant factors and scenario was a within participant factor. The main effect of order 
was not significant, F(3, 32) = 2.42, p = .084, = .185. The interaction of age and order, 
however, was significant, F(3, 32) = 3.26, p = .034, = .234. Simple effects analyses 
revealed that for order 2, younger adults were significantly more accurate than were older 
adults, t(8) = 2.86, p = .007, d = .425. Because this order effect was found for only one 
order, and there were only five participants in each order for each age group, it is likely 
that this is a spurious finding. It is improbable that this order effect will have any bearing 
on results ultimately derived from this experiment. Overall, there was no evidence of 
















Figure 6a. Reaction time data for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of 
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Experiment 2 Discussion 
 In Experiment 1, the emotionality of the changed object was a product of the 
valence of the object itself, as well as the trial type (appearance or disappearance). In 
other words, something negative or positive appearing is qualitatively different than when 
the same target disappears. For this reason, Experiment 2 was designed to isolate the role 
of top-down motivation on change detection of onsets and offsets in four different 
emotionally structured scenarios. Experiment 2 used four motivational scenarios to 
represent the four trial types in a naturalistic manner, and eliminated within-object 
valence possibilities by using non-emotional shape stimuli.  
 The main finding for Experiment 2 was that reaction times for onset trials 
compared to offset trials were quicker for both younger and older adults during the 
baseline, pleasant, and threat scenarios. This is sensible for the baseline condition, which 
most resembles a standard change detection task employing neutral items; without any 
specific emotional motivation, onsets typically confer a processing advantage well known 
in the visual attention literature (e.g. Brockmole & Henderson, 2005; Cole, Kentridge, 
Gellatly, & Heywood, 2003; Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2012, Jonides & Yantis, 1988). In 
the pleasant scenario, participants were instructed to conceptualize shapes appearing on 
the array as shooting stars as they viewed the night sky, and in the threat scenario, 
participants were instructed to imagine driving and maintaining vigilance of potential 
new objects appearing on the road that might jeopardize their safety. Although 
participants were not explicitly told to prioritize onset trials rather than offset trials, these 
scenarios naturally motivated participants to prioritize onset detection because of the 
emotional value of an onset in those situations. The two other scenarios were designed to 
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naturally prioritize offset detection in a similar manner. In the distress condition, 
participants were instructed to conceptualize objects leaving the array as children in their 
care wandering out of sight, and in the relief condition, objects disappearing were to 
represent an armed intruder having left one’s workplace. In these scenarios, in which an 
offset advantage was expected, although a true offset primacy did not emerge, onset trials 
were de-emphasized, as there were no differences in response times to onset and offset 
trials. Overall accuracy was higher for offsets across all scenarios. This may be evidence 
for a de-emphasized onset prioritization in the distress and relief conditions. Perhaps the 
evocative nature of this change detection task enabled participants to be more cognizant 
of offset trials, thus enabling higher accuracy therein.  
 Experiment 2 allowed for the examination of the interaction between valence and 
trial type, as well as furthering our understanding as to how explicit top-down 
motivational instructions impact how we may view, interact with, and respond to changes 
in a visual environment. Changes in this task operated differently than in Experiment 1 
because the combination of one particular emotion with one particular trial type were 
combined and examined in isolation of the other three potential combinations within each 
scenario block. Thus, in Experiment 2, we cannot conceptualize positive and negative 
events within the same block of trials in quite the same manner as in Experiment 1. Each 
scenario was specifically designed to prioritize only one of these combinations. That is, 
for example, participants were instructed to view new shapes entering into the array as 
oncoming cars that may pose a threat, but they were not instructed to treat cars 
disappearing from the array during offset trials as signaling something relieving. In many 
scenarios, such as driving, one trial type is naturally prioritized. Importantly, although it 
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is possible, it is not necessarily the case that threat is simply the inverse of relief. Future 
work should investigate scenarios in which onsets and offsets are equally motivating 
within the same block of trials to examine how these valence effects may operate in a 
variety of scenarios. 
 Other ways in which results of this experiment could be extended would be to 
improve the quality of the stimuli and motivations. The stimuli consisted of neutral 
objects in a two-dimensional array. A strength of Experiment 1 was to simulate change 
detection experience in naturalistic settings. However, use of neutral objects on a plain 
background was necessary for Experiment 2 in order to isolate the influence of top-down 
motivational manipulations and control for perceptual features of the objects. Given the 
simplicity of the images, it may have been difficult for some participants to implement 
the motivational instructions as efficiently as possible. Future work may consider using 
more naturalistic arrays that still control for as many perceptual features as possible.  The 
other obstacle participants may have encountered in Experiment 2 may have been the 
motivations themselves. Thus, even though these scenarios were most motivating based 
on results of the pilot study, there may have been individual difference factors leading to 
how well participants were able to implement the particular motivations used in this 
study.  
 Regardless of these potential areas of improvement, results of Experiment 2 
demonstrated attentional flexibility. Of course, there are benefits of positivity effects, 
such as lower cardiovascular reactivity and better emotion regulation ability (Labouvie-
Vief & Medler, 2002), however there are also benefits to demonstrating enhanced 
vigilance toward negative and threatening events because attention to negativity is 
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adaptive (e.g., Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009; Mather & Knight, 2006). 
Importantly, emotional stimuli can command attention both exogenously and 
endogenously. Emotional stimuli are often salient and noticeable (e.g., fast oncoming 
cars), and in these instances, it is likely that exogenous features of the environment will 
suppress an endogenous motive to react adaptively. However, humans can also be 
emotionally motivated internally in a meaningful way by way of endogenous attention, as 
demonstrated by how the top-down scenarios used in Experiment 2 altered how 
participants viewed the array. By observing evidence of onset primacy in the pleasant and 
threat conditions, and a de-emphasis of onset prioritization in the distress and relief 
conditions, participants (regardless of age) were able to adjust their attentional 
prioritization depending on their current behavioral goals and the demands of the present 
environment. This suggests that emotion is a crucial domain in for investigating the 
successful interplay of endogenous and exogenous elements of attentional processing.  
 Additionally, Reed and Carstensen (2012) argue that positivity effects are most 
robust when no additional goal processes are relevant to the task, and no particular 
attentional instructions are given, yet positive preferences were observed in Experiment 
1, in which speed and accuracy were attentional goals. The pattern of results obtained in 
Experiment 1 would correspond to a robust processing advantage for relief and pleasant 
scenarios in Experiment 2, but that is not what was observed. Reed and Carstensen argue 
that positivity effects may not emerge if another behavioral goal (such as the motivational 
instructions or instruction to respond both as quickly and as accurately as possible) 
overrides the SST-inspired goal of feeling as good as possible, yet at least for Experiment 
1, this attentional instruction did not override positive preferences. It is more likely that 
81 
 
the salience of the top-down manipulations for these evocative scenarios allowed 
participants to demonstrate attentional flexibility in unique ways.  
 One more important finding from Experiment 2 was that there were no age 
interactions for accuracy data, so other than older adults being slower than younger 
adults, their change detection ability was comparable to that of younger adults. Some 
previous work (e.g., Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, & Bucur, 2005; Colcome et al., 2003) 
has found that although older adults can maintain top-down control, they are more 
susceptible to attentional capture by distractors or difficulty with inhibition compared to 
younger adults. In the present study, all of the scenarios were imbued with top-down 
motivation. Within each motivational context, older adults were just as accurate as 
younger adults. Overall, older adults exhibited slower reaction times. However, slower 
speed may be due to distractibility, a different criterion for determinining the target 
location, or a motor impairment issue. However, accuracy data at least provide 
preliminary support for the preservation of top-down control for older adults in this type 
of emotional change detection task.  
 These data indicate evidence of attentional flexibility across the adult lifespan 
when performing emotional change detection tasks. Older adults in this experiment, as 
with Experiment 1, exhibited largely preserved change detection ability. Experiment 1 
highlights successful interaction of top-down and bottom-up processing resources with an 
overwhelming processing advantage for positive trials. In the present experiment, there is 
support for attentional flexibility. Even though these patterns of results do not necessarily 















The present experiments were designed to gain insight into change detection 
ability across the adult lifespan by investigating how younger and older adults may 
differentially engage with and respond to positive, negative, and neutral visual events as 
they enter and exit the visual field. Results of Experiment 1 provided support for positive 
preferences for both younger and older adults. The effect of positive preferences was 
noted both for positive onset trials and for negative offset trials, suggesting that both top-
down and bottom-up processing resources are intact in across age groups. For instance, 
detection of positive onset trials may have been guided by the perceptual salience (e.g., 
size or color) of positive objects when they appear in the second photograph, as these 
factors may have contributed to their noticeability, through bottom-up processing means. 
The other portion of the positivity preference observed in Experiment 1 involved a 
processing advantage for detection of negative offsets. This finding may represent 
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superior detection of a negative item in the first scene, a process driven by bottom-up 
means, followed by maintenance of that item in memory, and a quick response when that 
object is recognized to be the target. In this manner, an integration of top-down 
processing resources is also necessary in this task. Although Experiment 1 allows for the 
disentanglement of Trial type from Valence, the only goal participants were mindful of 
while completing this task was to be accurate and quick. The design of Experiment 2 
enabled the particular isolation of top-down motives, specifically, by analyzing how 
emotional motivation influences attentional performance in different affective scenarios. 
Overall, results of Experiment 2 provided support for attentional flexibility, as onset 
primacy was noted in the two conditions favoring an onset advantage (pleasant and 
threat), and the onset advantage did not emerge in the two conditions that would 
prioritize an offset advantage (relief and distress).   
On the surface, there appears to be some incongruence with results from the two 
experiments. However, in neither experiment was there evidence of any Age x Valence 
interaction; thus, younger and older adults were behaving similarly in both experiments. 
Overall, reaction time and accuracy data, as well as the lack of speed-accuracy trade-offs, 
support the preservation of change detection ability in later life based on these 
experiments. One of the main goals of these studies was to investigate the possibility of 
attentional flexibility as a product of both internal goals and external features of the 
environment as we age. It is clear through these experiments that different aspects of the 
environment were prioritized, and individuals from both age groups flexibly adjusted 
their attentional systems appropriately. For the positive preferences noted in Experiment 
1, participants had to efficiently process two different types of changes equivalently. 
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Positive onsets and negative offsets are fundamentally different visual events in that the 
target is appearing in one and disappearing in another; offsets entail a memorial 
component, whereas onsets do not. Finally, the target differed in emotional quality as a 
function of onset and offset. Because these trial types were chosen specifically as visual 
events we could plausibly encounter in our daily lives, this finding is critical for 
understanding the maintenance of attentional flexibility across the adult life span.  
In Experiment 2, the crucial difference, again, was the implementation of a 
motivational instruction to understand the influence of motivational endogenous effects 
on attention, over and above the top-down effects elicited from the emotional component. 
Both age groups were able to maintain attentional control throughout the paradigm, as 
demonstrated through high accuracy. The same explanation that could be aiding the 
positive preferences noted in Experiment 1 (e.g. perceptual features such as size of 
positive objects during onset trials and/or salience and memory for negative objects 
during offset trials) are not applicable to Experiment 2, in which two-dimensional neutral 
shapes were used as stimuli. One theory potentially useful for understanding the pattern 
of results that emerged in Experiment 2 is the Arousal-Biased Competition (ABC) model 
(Mather & Sutherland, 2011). According to the ABC model, arousal applies to emotional 
information processing in two ways. First, arousal enables prioritization of emotional 
information for its saliency. Emotional information is salient both due to bottom-up pop-
out effects in which emotional objects are perceptually different than neutral objects, as 
well as through top-down processing because of the meaning or value we ascribe to 
emotional objects based on prior experience and situational factors (Mather & 
Sutherland). Secondly, arousal enhances prioritization of goal-relevant and high priority 
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information. Above and beyond explaining that onsets were both goal relevant and 
naturally prioritized in the threat and pleasant conditions, and a compelling feature of 
visual attention literature, in these scenarios, according to ABC, onsets are also more 
arousing, and therefore more noticeable. Arousal magnifies the chance participants would 
efficiently detect onsets in the threat and pleasant conditions given the design of the 
emotional change detection task. Due to a lack of visual clutter and the simplicity of the 
object arrays, onsets were likely to be amplified in these conditions. While a full offset 
bias was not observed in the relief and distress conditions, there was a de-emphasis of 
onsets, in that onsets and offsets were detected with equivalent efficiency. Generally, 
offsets represent a fundamentally different type of visual event than object onsets. Even 
though offsets should have been prioritized and were goal relevant in the relief and 
distress conditions, factors including relevance of the scenarios and design of the stimuli, 
may have lead them to be less arousing.  
 It is important to note that the attentional flexibility observed for differences in 
trial type between the affective scenarios are particularly impressive because the target 
and the distractors were all neutrally valenced. Past research has indicated that locating a 
negative object alongside neutral distractors contributes to particularly efficient visual 
search, which could aid both younger and older adults in having faster reaction times and 
high accuracy during these negative trials (Hahn, Carlson, Gronlund, & Singer, 2005; 
Mather & Knight, 2006). In the present experiment, though, the only factor contributing 
to the “salience” of the target was participants’ ability to visualize the object as a threat 
because, visually, the objects shared similar perceptual properties to the distractors. This 
finding lends credence to older adults’ continued ability to maintain top-down control in 
86 
 
attention-demanding situations (Costello, Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010). 
They were slower than younger adults, however they still completed the task with high 
accuracy. Many instances of change detection that we could encounter in our daily lives 
entail affective components, which older adults could be particularly adept at handling 
(Mather & Carstensen, 2005). In Experiment 2, older adults’ pattern of results was very 
comparable to that of younger adults. 
 It is worth reiterating that scenarios used in the main experiment were chosen 
from the pilot study, and that both younger and older adult raters deemed these scenarios 
equally motivating. In addition to the stimuli making it difficult to implement the various 
motivational manipulations, it is also possible that the scenarios used were not self-
relevant to be fully motivating. Thus, a limitation of Experiment 2 could be the style of 
the pilot study. A future pilot study might instead involve a generative task, wherein, a 
sample of participants could be provided with a description of the four types of changes, 
and then come up with some scenarios that fit those descriptions that are motivating for 
them. The difficulty in generating these scenarios is that one visual event, either onset or 
offset, should naturally be prioritized. Using a coding procedure, if the same scenario 
emerges multiple times, that may signal a situation that would be worth investigating as a 
motivation. In Experiment 2, not all scenarios differed from baseline, and even the threat 
scenario did not differ significantly from the other affective scenarios. Future work could 
potentially include even more self-relevant scenarios in which individuals devise their 
own. Here, once a certain number of options had been generated for each scenario, 
participants could choose among those during the actual experiment.  
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 Moreover, the method of motivation could be altered. For example, as listed in the 
appendix, the motivations used in Experiment 2 were presented as written descriptions. 
Instead, a photograph of a busy street, or children playing, could have been used 
alongside the description to make the task seem less abstract, especially given the nature 
of the stimuli. 
 Additional limitations could be addressed in regards to Experiment 1. Again, 
although the images were chosen for the pilot study as objects that could feasibly appear 
in a kitchen scene, as well as being large enough for detection in this type of a task, the 
images were not perfect. Despite the positive preferences we observed, positive objects 
were rated as less intense on the positive scale compared to negative objects on the 
negative scale. Having a larger repertoire of objects to rate in the pilot study may have 
been one way of handling this critique. Another possibility is to have participants rate 
how likely each object was to be present in a kitchen scene, and then somehow control 
for this “belongingness” factor. This was partially controlled for in Experiment 1, but 
future work should more carefully control for it. For example, a pan and spatula are very 
typical for a kitchen, whereas mice and balloons, although feasible, probably arise less 
often. Within each valence, ratings for “belongingness” or typicality probably exist on a 
continuum. Objects that do not belong may represent a type of newness, which may 
attract observers’ attention. This attentional attraction may be life- saving in the case of a 
weapon being present, or a surprise if an uncommon positive object (e.g. anniversary 
present) is detected. Given that positive preferences were indicated both by the 
appearance of positive objects and the disappearance of negative objects in Experiment 1, 
88 
 
this limitation should not override conclusions drawn from the present study; 
nevertheless, implementing these changes could be valuable in future work.  
 A strength of Experiment 1 was the simulation of a more naturalistic change 
detection experience, and the images were designed to uphold this goal. However, this 
aim also introduced two important limitations. The first limitation was the potential for a 
“belonginess” confound, that could be handled in future studies by having participants 
rate the belonginess of each object to the scene used on a continuum and then including 
this factor as a covariate. The second limitation of this design is the task difficulty. 
Importantly, this task was not intended to be so difficult; however, by examining the 
present data and careful consideration of the images used, it is clear that the task used in 
Experiment 1 was considerably more challenging relative to Experiment 2.  
 One theory that could potentially account for the task difficulty of Experiment 1 is 
the clutter theory of attention. Clutter theory, applied to visual attention, defines clutter as 
visual noise, that can detract from performance, either through reductions in speed or 
accuracy, when set size increases with more objects present in a visual array (Wolfe, 
1998). Wolfe has conducted considerable research to understand how size should be 
determined, and the resulting effects. Researchers tend to agree that clutter impacts 
search efficiency. For example, Henderson (2009) demonstrated that clutter correlated 
negatively with search efficiency in real world scenes, such that search efficiency was 
higher with lower clutter and lower with higher clutter. Specifically, Ho, Scialfa, Caird, 
& Graw (2001) found that although younger adults’ performance was better on a visual 
search task compared to older adults, and performance for participants of both age groups 
declined as clutter increased, older adults’ performance with clutter was not 
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disproportionately worse relative to their younger counterparts. Ho et al.’s (2001) 
findings are reminiscent of results from Experiment 1. Older adults demonstrated lower 
accuracy and slower speed overall, but their performance was still quite high considering 
the task difficulty. More recent work on clutter has found that spatial and object working 
memory impacts performance more severely when more naturalistic scenes are used 
compared to stimuli used in more traditional search tasks (Ren & Sun, 2014).  Because 
the images used in Experiment 1 were intended to be naturalistic, they likely contained a 
more cluttered array than would be encountered in a typical change detection experiment.  
 The images used in Experiment 1 depicted 6 different kitchen scenes to avoid 
habituation to the background environment, which may have reduced the overall valence 
of the targets. Even though the set sizes used were approximately equal, there were 
additional elements, such as cupboards and counters, which added to scene complexity 
(e.g., along with texture gradients and depth that are present in most visual 
environments). Thus, it would be advantageous for participants to ignore fixed objects 
these scene features. However, if the visual environment is too cluttered, it is possible 
that extraneous features capture attention, leading to inefficient change detection, which 
then could account for the lower accuracy observed in Experiment 1 compared to 
Experiment 2.  
 This theory may also help explain the emergence of the overarching offset 
advantage noted in Experiment 1. In a more cluttered array, it may be easier for observers 
to notice the disappearance of a previously viewed object rather than the onset of a new 
object. In Experiment 1, many visual characteristics, such as set size, depth, and 
complexity were accounted for, but as a byproduct, these considerations may have 
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detracted from the valence of the objects in the array.  Thus, it may also be important to 
experiment with depth of field to maximize the size of objects, relative to other items in 
the array. Using photographs of kitchen scenes limited object placement to mainly 
countertops and kitchen islands; thus, to make placement of the objects believable within 
these scenes, some of the objects were not very large. Future work should consider using 
other scenes, such as an outdoor environment, or indoor scenes with more natural 
surfaces on which to place objects, with a simpler background. This may enable objects 
to appear larger, if they can be placed in the foreground, as well as in the background, 
and this manipulation may make them easier to spot in the scene as well as increase the 
salience of emotional objects. Future work should seek to create images that are less 
complex and cluttered, but are still naturalistic, so that valence effects are more salient.  
 It is not necessarily a limitation that the stimuli used in Experiment 2 were 
intentionally created to be two-dimensional and non-emotional because this design 
allowed for the isolation of top down effects of motivation on change detection. Most 
instances of change detection are inherently motivating and occur in naturalistic 
environments; however, combining the top-down motivational component of Experiment 
2 would not allow this effect to be isolated from the investigation of Trial type and 
Valence.  
Conclusion 
 Investigating the effect of emotion and types of visual changes are particularly 
important across the adult lifespan because adequate change detection ability can be 
important for adaptation and survival. A main goal of the experiments was to determine 
how studying change detection from an aging perspective is critical both for informing 
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theories on aging, theories on emotional processing, and theories regarding the role of 
top-down and bottom-up processing on attention. The main aging theory of interest for 
the present study was Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & 
Charles, 1999). However, observed results did not fully support this theory. Experiment 1 
exhibited general positive preferences that were not age specific, and Experiment 2 
revealed support for threat effects. However, these findings do support maintenance of an 
interaction of top-down and bottom-up processing resources in attention in later life 
(Yantis, 2005). Furthermore, results of the present experiments help delineate factors 
(e.g., target valence, motivational goals of observer, type of visual event) that impact 
attentional capture and how observers respond to emotional information. In Experiment 
1, a processing advantage was observed across age groups for positive onsets and 
negative offsets, as well as for offset detection overall, and in Experiment 2, with the 
addition of a salient top-down motivational component, onset prioritization was noted in 
the pleasant and threat conditions favoring onset detection, and onsets were de-
emphasized in distress and relief conditions that naturally should have prioritized offset 
detection. These results contribute to our understanding of cognitive emotional 
information processing in aging because older adults can flexibly adapt attention in order 
to detect different types of visual events, much like younger adults.  Older adults are 
adept at processing visual changes with varying emotional salience, similar to younger 
adults, and can maintain top-down control when stimuli are sufficiently self-relevant. 
Attention is a multi-faceted process and should be thoroughly considered in an aging 
framework to understand how attentional faculties, such as change detection, develop 
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The words listed below describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and 
then, in the space next to that word, indicate the extent to which you GENERALLY feel 
that way; that is, how you feel on average.  
1 2 3 4 5 
Very slightly or 
not at all 
A little 
 
Moderately Quite a bit Extremely 
 
_____ Interested  _____ Irritable 
_____ Distressed  _____ Alert 
_____ Excited  _____ Ashamed 
_____ Upset  _____ Inspired 
_____ Strong  _____ Nervous 
_____ Guilty  _____ Determined 
_____ Scared  _____ Attentive 
_____ Hostile  _____ Jittery 
_____ Enthusiastic   _____ Active 











Below is a list of ways you might have felt or behaved. Please indicate how often you 
have felt this way during the past week by circling the number at the end of each 
statement corresponding to the four numbered statements listed between the lines below. 
 
During the Past week  0. Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day) 
   1. Some or a little of the time (1-2 days) 
   2. Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days) 
   3. Most or all of the time (5-7 days) 
 
1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me. 0 1 2 3 
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 0 1 2 3 
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues, even with help 









4. I felt that I was just as good as other people. 0 1 2 3 
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 0 1 2 3 
6. I felt depressed.  0 1 2 3 
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort.  0 1 2 3 
8. I felt hopeful about the future. 0 1 2 3 
9. I thought my life had been a failure. 0 1 2 3 
10. I felt fearful. 0 1 2 3 
11. My sleep was restless 0 1 2 3 
12. I was happy. 0 1 2 3 
13. I talked less than usual. 0 1 2 3 
14. I felt lonely. 0 1 2 3 
15. People were unfriendly. 0 1 2 3 
16. I enjoyed life. 0 1 2 3 
17. I had crying spells. 0 1 2 3 
18. I felt sad. 0 1 2 3 
19. I felt that people disliked me. 0 1 2 3 











A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. 
Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to indicate how you 
generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any 
one statement, but give the answer that seems to describe how you generally feel.  
 
Generally:  1. Almost Never 
   2. Sometimes 
   3. Often 
   4. Almost always  
 
1. I feel pleasant. 1 2 3 4 
2. I feel nervous and restless. 1 2 3 4 
3. I feel satisfied with myself 1 2 3 4 
4. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be 1 2 3 4 
5. I feel like a failure 1 2 3 4 
6. I feel rested 1 2 3 4 
7. I am “calm, cool, and collected.” 1 2 3 4 




















10. I am happy. 1 2 3 4 
11. I have disturbing thoughts. 1 2 3 4 
12. I lack self-confidence. 1 2 3 4 
13. I feel insecure 1 2 3 4 
14. I make decisions easily. 1 2 3 4 
15. I feel inadequate. 1 2 3 4 
16. I am content. 1 2 3 4 










18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them 









19. I am a steady person. 1 2 3 4 
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my 
recent concerns and interests 








E. Shipley Vocabulary Test 
In the test below, the first word in each line is printed in capital letters. Opposite it are 
four other words. Circle the one word that means the same thing, or nearly the same 
thing, as the first word. If you don’t know, guess. Be sure to circle the one word in each 
line that means the same thing as the first word. 
1. TALK:   draw   eat   speak   sleep 
2. PERMIT:   allow   sew   cut   drive 
3. PARDON:   forgive  pound   divide   tell 
4. COUCH:   pin   eraser   sofa   glass 
5. REMEMBER:  swim   recall   number  defy 
6. TUMBLE:   drink   dress   fall   think 
7. HIDEOUS:  silvery  tilted   young   dreadful 
8. CORDIAL:  swift   muddy  leafy   hearty 
9. EVIDENT:   green   obvious  skeptical  afraid 
10. IMPOSTOR:  conductor  officer   book   pretender 
11. MERIT:   deserve  distrust  fight   separate 
12. FASCINATE:  welcome  fix   stir   enchant 
13. INDICATE:  defy   excite   signify  bicker 
14. IGNORANT:  red   sharp   uninformed  precise 
15. FORTIFY:  submerge  strengthen  vent   deaden 
16. RENOWN:  length   head   fame   loyalty 
17. NARRATE:  yield   buy   associate  tell 
18. MASSIVE:  bright   large   speedy  low 
19. MILITANCY: laughter  speed   grace   malice 
20. SMIRCHED:  stolen   pointed  remade  soiled 
21. SQUANDER:  tease   belittle  out   waste 
22. CAPTION:  drum   ballast   heading  ape 
23. FACILITATE:  help   turn   strip   bewilder 
24. JOCOSE:   humorous  paltry   fervid   plain 
25. APPRISE:  reduce   strew   inform  delight 
26. RUE:   eat   lament  dominate  cure 
27. DENIZEN:  senator  inhabitant  fish   atom 
28. DIVEST:   dispossess  intrude  rally   pledge 
29. AMULET:  charm   orphan  dingo   pond 
30. INEXORABLE:  untidy   involatile  rigid   sparse 
31. SERRATED:  dried   notched  armed   blunt 
32. LISSOM:   moldy   loose   supple   convex 
33. MOLLIFY:  mitigate direct   pertain  abuse 
34. PLAGIARIZE:  appropriate  intend   revoke  maintain 
35. ORIFICE:  brush   hole   building  lute 
36. QUERULOUS:  maniacal  curious  devout  complaining 
37. PARIAH:   outcast  priest   lentil  locker 
38. ABET:   waken   ensue   incite   placate 
39. TEMERITY:  rashness  timidity  desire   kindness 
40. PRISTINE:  vain   sound   first   level 
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Cognitive Measures: Mental Control Task 















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14  
 
15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
 2             0 
 
1             1 
 
0             2 
 
7+’ 5-6’  4’  1-3’ 
 
 
0      1     2     3 
 
 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O 
 
P Q R S T U V W X Y Z 
 
 2             0 
 
1             1 
 
0             2 
 
7+’ 5-6’  4’  1-3’ 
 
 




Sun Mon Tue Wed Thur Fri Sat 
 
 
 2             0 
 
1             1 
 
0             2 
 
4+’     2-3’   1’    
 
 
0          2      3 
 
 
Jan Feb March April May June 
 
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
 
 2             0 
 
1             1 
 
0             2 
 
5+’       4’    1-3’ 
 
 
0           2     3 
 
 
20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11  
 
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 2             0 
 
1             1 
 
0             2 
 
11+’ 8-10’  6-7’  1-5’ 
 
 




Sat Fri Thur Wed Tue Mon Sun 
 
 
 2             0 
 
1             1 
 
0             2 
 
6+’     5’       4’    1-3’ 
 
 
0        1         2       3 
 
 
Dec Nov Oct Sept Aug July June 
 
May April March Feb Jan 
 
 2             0 
 
1             1 
 
0             2 
 
17+’ 12-16’  10-11’  1-9’ 
 
 
0          1          2         3 
 
 
(0) Sun (6) Mon (12) Tue (18)  
 
Wed (24) Thur (30) Fri (36) Sat 
 
 2             0 
 
1             1 
 
0             2 
 
21+’ 16-20’  13-15’  1-12’ 
 
 
0           1           2        3 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: “I want you to state a series of information to me as quickly as 
possible. These series will include numbers, days of week, months of the year, etc. You 




Cognitive Measures: Generative Naming (FAS) 
 
Word Fluency Measure 
 
Instructions: I am going to say a letter of the alphabet and I would like you to name as 
many words as you can think of that begin with that letter. For example, let’s take the 
letter B. I could name the words ball, bar, beer, brick, baby. Can you think of some other 
words that being with that letter? (have the subject practice the task) 
 
Now I will say another letter and I’m going to time you for one minute. I cannot count 
numbers or names of people or places and do not repeat words with different endings like 
please, pleasing, pleasingly. Now, name as many words as you can think of that begin 
with the following letters: 
 
(Time the subject for one minute. Be sure to record every response and UNDERLINE 
ANY ERRORS.) 
 
F A S 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
Total # F =  Total #A =  Total #S =  












0 or 1 
1 Trial 1 2-4 (4-2)   
 Trial 2 5-7 (7-5)   
2 Trial 1 6-2-9 (9-2-6)   
 Trial 2 4-1-5 (5-1-4)   
3 Trial 1 3-2-7-9 (9-7-2-3)   
 Trial 2 4-9-8-6     (6-8-9-4)  
4 Trial 1 1-5-2-8-6  (6-8-2-5-1)  
 Trial 2 6-1-8-4-3   (3-4-8-1-6)  
5 Trial 1 5-3-9-4-1-8   (8-1-4-9-3-5)  
 Trial 2 7-2-4-8-5-6   (6-5-8-4-2-7)  
6 Trial 1 8-1-2-9-3-6-5   (5-6-3-9-2-1-8)  
 Trial 2 4-7-3-9-1-2-8   (8-2-1-9-3-7-4)  
7 Trial 1 9-4-3-7-6-2-5-8  (8-5-2-6-7-3-4-9)  
 Trial 2 7-2-8-1-9-6-5-3  (3-5-6-9-1-8-2-7)  
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: “I am going to say a series of numbers out loud to you. Please repeat 
these numbers back to me in REVERSE order. For instance, if I said the numbers 3-6; 
you would say _______.” 
 
Note: Discontinue the task once the subject misses both trials within the same item. Each 
trial is worth one point. Tabulate the number of points (out of a possible 14) at the end of 














G. Experiment 1 Stimuli 
Positive Objects Negative Objects Neutral Objects 
Milkshake Bomb Blender 
Latte Stained mug* Clipboard 
Strawberry Bloody knife Water bottle* 
Wine stopper Spilled coffee Pan 
Ice cream Dagger* Dice 
Flowerpot Knife Hole punch 
Cookie jar Gun Goggles 
Award Needle Glasses* 
Cake Ash tray Pencil 
Dessert tray Bee Napkin 
Cappuccino Mace Kettle 
Gold watch* Pistol Spatula 
Broach* Poison Waffle press* 
Money Spider Whistle 
Cupcake Skull Towel 
Pie* Dirty dishes* Umbrella 
Slinky* Apple core* Headphones 
Orchid Dirty plate Coffee pot* 
Sundae Mouse Notebook* 
Wine glass Cockroach Gravy boat 
Trophy* Rotten banana Muffin pan 
Rings Flies on waffle* Book 
Flower bouquet Rotten peach Placemat 
Balloon Spilled milk Coffee in mug 
Cinnamon roll Shiny insect Rolling pin 
 








H. Experiment 2 Motivational Scenario Instructions 
Pleasant (positive onset)- For this block of trials, imagine you are outside stargazing on a 
clear night. As you view the objects in these trials, imagine that each object represents a 
star in the night sky. In addition to the typical constellations of stars, you are paying close 
attention to new stars that appear in the night sky because these might be shooting stars.  
Threat (negative onset)- For this block of trials, imagine you are driving a car. As you 
view the objects in these trials, imagine that each object represents another care on the 
road. You must pay close attention to new cars that appear on the road to maintain your 
own safety. 
Distress (positive offset)- For this block of trials, imagine you work at a daycare. As you 
view the objects in these trials, imagine that each object represents a child in your care. 
After all the children have been dropped off, you supervise the kids while they play at an 
outdoor playground. Your goal is to remain vigilant to the location of the children and 
pay close attention of an object (child) disappears.  
Relief (negative offset)- For this block of trials, imagine you are in a particularly 
frightening situation in which an armed individual might be in the building where you 
work. The objects represent other people. Your goal is to remain vigilant to objects that 
may disappear, as this would signal that the intruder has left and your workplace is safe 
once again.  
 
  
 
